On March 24, 2020, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Joint Antitrust Statement Regarding COVID-19. In this statement, the FTC and DOJ recognize that public health efforts in response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) require government and private cooperation. To address the speed at which companies and individuals must engage in COVID-19 response activities, the FTC and DOJ will respond to COVID-19-related requests for advisory opinions and business review letters within an expedited seven days of receipt of all information.
With COVID-19-related closures rolling in daily, you may have questions about the operating status of the federal government’s antitrust enforcement agencies. Currently, the HSR review process does not seem to be significantly impacted, although the agencies will not grant a request for early termination during this period (as noted in our recent update, the FTC will again process early termination requests as of March 30, though on a more limited basis and later in the process than historically provided). Unlike the government shutdowns in 2013 and 2018, all FTC and DOJ staff are working full time. In addition, the agencies have implemented a mandatory e-filing system for all HSRs.
Given that the agencies will continue to work full-time and that an e-filing system is in place, we think it is unlikely that there will be significant impact on timing for the vast majority of transactions, particularly where there is no competitive overlap between the transacting companies.
Last month, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released updated Vertical Merger Guidelines in draft form. These guidelines provide a useful resource for aerospace and defense contractors involved in M&A transactions. Vertical competition issues frequently arise in this industry given the nature of the supply base and contracting and supply relationships between companies operating at different levels of the supply chain.
This is the first time the antitrust agencies have released updated guidelines for analyzing vertical mergers since 1984. Although the agencies have updated the Horizontal Merger Guidelines several times since then (most recently in 2010), they have not provided similar updated guidance to businesses regarding vertical merger enforcement until now. The new guidelines summarize the practices, standards, and theories the agencies have used in evaluating vertical mergers for a number of years. Although the guidelines do not signal any shifts in current agency practice, they do provide the business community greater transparency about how the agencies analyze vertical mergers. This is helpful for the aerospace and defense industry, which is particularly susceptible to vertical competition issues given the heavy reliance on contracting out important elements at different levels of the supply chain.
Antitrust regulators in the United States and Europe were very active in the final quarter of 2019. The FTC and DOJ continue to investigate and challenge M&A transactions in a variety of industries. Events of this quarter highlight the importance of states in merger enforcement. As well, recent FTC activity highlights the regulators’ focus on preventing monopolists from buying nascent competitors.
In Europe, the UK CMA continues to expand its role as a key jurisdiction in the merger clearance process, which will only accelerate with Brexit. The EC agreed to clear, subject to conditions, acquisitions in the aluminum production and battery industries as well as in the wholesale supply and retail distribution of TV channels after conducting Phase II reviews. Moreover, the EC opened new in-depth investigations into transactions in the copper refining and engineering sectors.
Today the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released joint guidance concerning competition for biologics, including biosimilars. The joint guidance seeks to enhance competition for biologics and reduce manufacturers’ use of false or misleading statements or promotional communications concerning the efficacy or safety of biosimilars and other biologics. This guidance appears to be part of the Trump administration’s effort to reduce the cost of medications for consumers, as it is aimed at increasing the level of competition biosimilars can offer and raising awareness of the safety and efficacy of biosimilars.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is considering a rulemaking to address the use of non-compete provisions in employment contracts. On January 9, 2020, the FTC held a day-long workshop to start a public conversation on whether it should use its rulemaking power to take on this issue. The two Democratic Commissioners have expressed strong support for an FTC rulemaking, while the Republican Commissioners appear less open to a rulemaking effort.
If the FTC were to regulate non-competes, this would be a significant development in an area traditionally governed by state law. It remains unclear whether the FTC will move forward with a rulemaking and what a potential FTC rule would look like. However, the FTC workshop highlights growing concern about non-competes and their impacts on workers and labor markets.
The US Federal Trade Commission today announced increased thresholds for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 and for determining whether parties trigger the prohibition against interlocking directors under Section 8 of the Clayton Act.
Notification Threshold Adjustments
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced revised thresholds for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR) pre-merger notifications on January 28, 2020. These increased thresholds will become effective on February 27, 2020. These new thresholds apply to any transaction that closes on or after the effective date.
The US antitrust regulators continue to challenge consummated transactions. On January 3, 2020, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against Axon Enterprise, Inc., challenging its consummated acquisition of VieVu, a body-worn camera competitor, from Safariland. The FTC also challenged non-compete agreements that Axon and Safariland signed in connection with the acquisition. The complaint demonstrates the FTC’s continued focus on challenging consummated transactions, and on defining “price discrimination markets” around sets of customers with unique needs. The FTC’s challenge also shows that merging parties should avoid signing non-compete agreements that are not reasonably limited in scope and duration. If these agreements are not appropriately tailored to achieving a legitimate business interest, the FTC may challenge them as anticompetitive.
For the first time since the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) published non-horizontal merger guidelines in 1984, the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued updated Vertical Merger Guidelines to explain how the antitrust agencies analyze vertical mergers. The guidelines were published in draft on January 10, 2020, and are now open for a 30-day public comment period.
WHAT HAPPENED:
The DOJ and FTC released draft guidelines outlining the principal analytical techniques, practices and enforcement policies the antitrust agencies will use to analyze vertical mergers and acquisitions. Vertical mergers combine firms or assets that operate at different stages of the same supply chain. For example, vertical mergers or acquisitions could combine companies such as:
a satellite maker and a payload provider;
an automaker and an aluminum supplier;
an automaker and an automotive retailer;
a filmmaker and a cable television company; or
a pharmaceutical company and a chemical company making active pharmaceutical ingredients.
The merging companies do not compete with each other, but rather work with each other through the supply of inputs, distribution or other business services. The draft guidelines are relatively limited in scope and do not significantly expand the theories and issues that US antitrust regulators have been applying to vertical mergers for several years. That said, having these theories on paper will provide helpful guideposts in assessing potential transactions. At the FTC, the two Democratic Commissioners abstained from voting to release the guidelines, issuing Dissenting Statements instead.
The draft guidelines rely on the well-established principles in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines on how to define product markets and measure concentration levels. The guidelines establish a safe harbor if the companies have a share of less than 20% in the relevant market(s), but set no presumption of anticompetitive harm if market shares are higher than that. The focus of these new draft vertical merger guidelines is on the competitive effects analysis and not on shares or any formulaic assessment. The basic concern is whether combining two companies at different levels in a supply chain will enable the combined company to lessen competition at one of the levels.
Unilateral Effects
First, the guidelines discuss potential unilateral anticompetitive effects from vertical mergers under two theories: (1) foreclosure/raising rivals’ costs and (2) access to competitively sensitive information.
Raising rivals costs / foreclosure. The first theory suggests that “[a] vertical merger may diminish competition by allowing the merged firm to profitably weaken . . . one or more of its actual or potential rivals in the relevant market by changing the terms of those rivals’ access to one or more related products.” Alternatively, the merged firm could refuse to supply rivals altogether, foreclosing their access to a necessary product or service. The guidelines lay out the following key conditions for a foreclosure theory:
The foreclosure makes it more difficult for the company that is foreclosed to compete effectively.
The newly merged firm is likely to win more business if it denies or disadvantages the [...]
Three recent antitrust merger reviews involving nascent competition demonstrate enforcers are paying close attention to acquisitions by industry leaders of emerging, but early-stage competitors. The US antitrust agencies have been criticized for allowing leading technology companies to extend their entrenched positions to multiple markets or technologies through acquisitions. We are now seeing regulators increasing their scrutiny of acquisitions of nascent competitors that were positioning themselves to challenge an entrenched, strong rival.
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