McDermott has authored the Italian chapter of the 2016 edition of “Intellectual Property & Antitrust” published by Getting the Deal Through, a valuable work tool for legal practitioners dealing with intellectual property and competition law.
This chapter addresses the statutes for granting IP rights, enforcement options and remedies, as well as the interplay between Italian IP and competition legislation, jurisdiction of competition and IP agencies, cartels, price maintenance, abuse of dominance and remedies.
In a decision written by Judge Marsha S. Berzon, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appels for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a first-of-its-kind district court judgment relating to royalty rates for standard-essential patents (SEP). As part of the standard setting process, many standards organizations require members who hold patents necessary to implement a given standard to commit to license those patents on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (RAND). Because inclusion in a standard can increase the importance and value of a patent, parties often differ on what constitutes a reasonable royalty. In this case, district court Judge James Robarts of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington established a multi-factor framework to determine the appropriate royalty rates and ranges for SEPs. Several other courts later employed similar approaches. Motorola’s appeal challenged the district court’s authority to determine the royalty rate at a bench trial. The company also contended that the district court mis-applied Federal Circuit precedent on patent damages. The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that Motorola had consented to the bench trial and holding that Judge Robart’s “thoughtful and detailed analysis” was “consistent with the Federal Circuit’s recent approach.” Microsoft Corp. v, Motorola, Inc. et al; Case No 14-35393 (9th Cir, July 30, 2015) (Berzon, J.)
Procedural Background
The long-running patent dispute between Microsoft and Motorola spans several courts and countries. The crux of the conflict traces back to October 2010 when Microsoft sued Motorola for alleged infringement of certain smartphone patents. Thereafter, the parties explored a possible cross-licensing arrangement to resolve their dispute. Motorola sent letters proposing licenses for 802.11 and H.264 SEP portfolios, with a proposed royalty rate of 2.25 percent of the price of the end product, which Motorola represented was in keeping with its RAND commitments on the patents. Microsoft disagreed. Soon after, it filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that Motorola had breached its RAND commitments to the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the standard-setting organizations that developed the 802.11 and H.264 standards. Motorola responded by filing suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, seeking an injunction to prevent Microsoft from using its H.264 patents. The cases were consolidated before Judge Robart in the Western District of Washington. Motorola also brought patent-enforcement actions before the International Trade Commission and in Germany. Microsoft alleged in an amended complaint that the filing of these injunctive orders constituted a breach of contract on the grounds that a RAND commitment bars a patent holder from seeking injunctive relief.
The proceedings before Judge Robart slowly moved forward throughout 2011 and 2012. The district court held that the RAND commitment made by Motorola to the standard-setting organizations created an enforceable contract, which standard users like Microsoft are able to enforce as third-party beneficiaries. Judge Robart determined, however, that, in order for a jury to determine whether Motorola had breached its RAND commitment, it must first know what the [...]
The long-awaited ruling on the seeking of injunctions in the context of standard-essential patents encumbered by fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms has been delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Huawei v. ZTE C 170/130. Although the judgment lays down the legal test applicable to injunctions involving standard-essential patents, and significantly clarifies the landscape that had previously been shaped by the European Commission, a number of issues remain unresolved.
Huawei Technologies entered into negotiations with ZTE Corporation over the possibility of concluding a licence agreement in relation to Huawei’s patent that is essential to the long-term evolution (commonly known as 4G) standard, on FRAND terms. Given that negotiations between the companies were unsuccessful, and because Huawei contends that ZTE continued using the standard-essential patent (SEP) without paying royalties, Huawei brought an infringement action against ZTE, seeking an injunction to stop the sale of certain ZTE products.
In adjudicating the matter, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf considered that the outcome of the litigation largely depended on whether or not the action brought by Huawei constituted an abuse of dominance. Given this consideration, and the uncertainty surrounding the topic of SEP injunctions, the Court made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. The Court asked in what circumstances a dominant SEP holder, who has committed to grant licences to third parties on FRAND terms, can seek an injunction to stop an infringement of that SEP, or to recall products manufactured using the SEP, is to be regarded as committing an abuse contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The Test for SEP Injunctions
The CJEU decided that the following conditions must be satisfied before a dominant SEP licensor can validly bring an injunction against a party infringing an SEP, without acting contrary to Article 102 TFEU.
Notification From The SEP Holder
Prior to taking any action, a SEP holder that has given an irrevocable undertaking to a standardisation body to grant a licence to third parties on FRAND terms, must alert the alleged infringer to the infringement complained about. This prior notice must designate the SEP in question, and specify the way in which it has been infringed.
“Willingness” of The Alleged Infringer
After the alleged infringer has been informed about the infringement, it must (somehow) express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. Presumably, this willingness refers to the alleged infringer agreeing to receive a FRAND offer from the SEP holder. It would seem, therefore, that an alleged infringer who is not prepared to enter into any sort of bona fide negotiations would be presumed to be unwilling.
Unfortunately, although the CJEU refers to the concept of “willingness”, it does not address the criteria for determining the alleged infringer’s willingness. The ruling therefore does not make it entirely clear what the potential licensee should do in order to be treated as willing.
FRAND Offer
The SEP holder must present to the alleged infringer [...]
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a 6-3 decision, left undisturbed the rule from its 51-year-old decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. (1964), invoking stare decisis and rejecting arguments seeking to overturn the rule barring patent royalty agreements that obligate payment of post-patent expiration royalties. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, Case No. 13-720 (Supr. Ct., June 22, 2015) (Kagan, Justice) (Alito, Justice dissenting). In Kimble, the Court addressed the question of whether parties to a patent license may agree that a licensee must continue paying royalties based on sales of products after the licensed patent(s) expire, and answered the question “No,” continuing the rule that such agreements are unlawful per se.
Since Brulotte was decided 51 years ago, many courts and commentators have criticized the rule it laid down as wrongly decided as a matter of economic policy. While the Kimble decision, based essentially on stare decisis, preserves the Brulotte status quo in patent licensing, Justice Kagan has now raised the profile of this judge-made rule and related economic arguments to the branch of government that the Supreme Court concluded had the exclusive power to change it: Congress.
Brulotte
When the Supreme Court decided Brulotte, it prohibited the extension of the “patent monopoly” beyond the term of the patent. The Court held that “a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.” In other words, once the patent expires, the invention is dedicated to the public, and the patent owner cannot continue to demand royalties for use of the patented invention after expirations of the patent term. In dicta, however, the Court distinguished impermissible payments due for use of an invention during the post-expiration period from “deferred payments for use during the pre-expiration period,” which remained permissible.
Kimble
In this case, an inventor (Kimble) licensed a patent on a novelty Spider Man web-slinging toy to Marvel Entertainment. The parties, unaware of Brulotte at the time of licensing, agreed to a license whereby Marvel would pay Kimble an upfront sum plus a 3 percent royalty for all sales going forward. The license agreement included no fixed term. However, after Marvel learned of the Brulotte rule, it filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a ruling that it could cease paying Kimble royalties as of the expiration of Kimble’s patent term in 2010. The district court agreed with Marvel, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. (IP Update, Vol. 16, No. 8).
Stare Decisis
In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected Kimble’s arguments seeking to overturn the Brulotte rule. Kimble argued that the economic rationale underlying Brulotte was no longer correct, and that prohibiting post-expiration royalties made it inefficient and difficult to allocate risks and rewards, especially for patented technology that may take a significant amount of time to commercialize (such as pharmaceuticals). Marvel responded simply that [...]
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently issued a business review letter stating that it would not challenge the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.’s (IEEE’s) proposed revisions to its patent policy. These patent policy revisions seek to address the “wide divergence” in expectations between holders of patents essential to an IEEE standard and the market participants seeking to implement such standards. The DOJ’s response looked favorably on the IEEE’s proposed revisions pertaining to RAND royalties and limitations on injunctive relief for standard-essential patent holders.
On January 6, 2015, the Second Circuit granted defendants’ motion for an expedited appeal but denied their motion for a stay in New York v. Actavis PLC, 14-4624 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2015). Defendants are manufacturers of Namenda, a brand name pharmaceutical prescribed to patients with moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease. New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed suit against the defendants in September 2014, alleging that the defendants’ plan to cease production of Namenda IR, a twice-daily instant release formulary whose patent expires in April 2015, was motivated by anticompetitive concerns and violated federal and state antitrust laws. According to Schneiderman, defendants’ motive for ceasing sales of Namenda IR was to force patients to switch to Namenda XR, an extended release formulary of the drug with a longer patent life. Converting patients to Namenda XR before the expiration of the Namenda IR patent would negate generic manufacturers’ ability to win market share through the automatic substitution of generic drugs for brand name prescriptions required under many state laws because the generic instant release formulary is not “bioequivalent” to the extended release version.
The Southern District of New York found that the “hard switch” from Namenda IR to XR would injure competition and consumers and granted the state’s motion for a preliminary injunction on December 11, 2014. Defendants presented evidence that switching to the extended release formula would benefit patients by reducing the number of doses they would need to take each day, which can be particularly beneficial for patients with memory problems. However, the court concluded that the purpose of defendants’ plan was to nullify state generic substitution laws and that defendants failed to establish any cognizable harm that would result from an injunction requiring them to continue selling Namenda IR. The harm defendants sought to avoid, the court explained, was the intended effect of the federal and state regulatory regimes at play: increased competition.
The Second Circuit’s January 6 order was brief and not accompanied by an opinion. The court held that the defendants had not met the standard for a stay of the injunction, citing In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007). The court granted their motion for an expedited appeal and ordered them to submit an expedited briefing schedule within seven days.
Addressing whether the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity is limited to sham litigation in courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a lower court’s summary judgment of no antitrust liability, finding that antitrust liability can attach to sham administrative petitions and that the sham litigation exception is not limited to court litigation. Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., Case No. 13-1386 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 6, 2014) (Bryson, J.) (Newman, J., dissenting).
Tyco Healthcare acquired patents relating to temazepam, an insomnia drug marketed as Restoril. Seeking Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval to manufacture and sell generic temazepam, Mutual Pharmaceutical filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), certifying that its generic product would not infringe any patents. Tyco disagreed and sued Mutual for infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The district court rejected this claim, reasoning that products manufactured to the ANDA’s specification could not infringe. Tyco then filed a citizen petition with the FDA, urging new guidelines to require generic temazepam manufacturers to more extensively demonstrate bioequivalence to Restoril. The FDA denied Tyco’s citizen’s petition “indicating that, in the FDA’s view, it was wholly without merit.”
In response to Tyco’s infringement suit, Mutual brought antitrust counterclaims, including allegations that Tyco’s suit and citizen petition were shams. In other words, Mutual argued that Tyco used illegitimate means to keep Mutual’s product off the market. On summary judgment, the district court rejected these counterclaims, holding that it was reasonable for Tyco to proceed with its infringement action and that antitrust liability for sham claims cannot apply to filing administrative petitions because the exception “is expressly limited to litigation.” Mutual appealed.
The Federal Circuit vacated the rulings on antitrust issues and remanded for further consideration. With regard to Tyco’s Hatch-Waxman claim, the Federal Circuit found that it was not unreasonable for a patent owner to allege infringement under Hatch-Waxman if the patent owner has evidence that the as-marketed commercial ANDA product will infringe, even though the hypothetical product specified in the ANDA could not infringe. The Court concluded that further inquiry was necessary to determine if Tyco’s factual theory of infringement was objectively baseless. With regard to the administrative proceeding, the Court found that the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington is not limited to court litigation, and that it has been applied to administrative petitions, including FDA citizen petitions. Accordingly, it remanded this counterclaim for resolution of fact issues regarding whether the citizen petition was objectively baseless and motivated by a subjective desire to directly interfere with Mutual, as well as whether Mutual suffered any anticompetitive injury.
Judge Newman dissented from the court’s conversion of routine patent litigation into antitrust violations, arguing that “[e]nforcement of a presumptively valid patent against a product that infringes by statute [Hatch-Waxman] cannot be deemed objectively baseless” and patent holders have “the right to communicate with the FDA concerning public information on matters within the agency’s authority and responsibility without incurring antitrust liability.”
On Friday, August 15, 2014, Judge Gerald McHugh of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania let stand several counterclaims that IMS Health Inc. (IMS) made against Symphony Health Solutions Corp. (Symphony) in connection with related to allegations that Symphony had poached IMS employees to steal trade secrets.
In July 2013, Symphony brought a complaint against IMS, the largest pharmaceutical data and analytics company in the world, alleging that IMS unlawfully abused its monopoly power in pharmaceutical data markets and violated the antitrust laws through various types of horizontal and vertical exclusionary conduct, including entering into exclusive long-term agreements with data suppliers, requiring data suppliers to sign most-favored-nation clauses, acquiring rivals to eliminate competition, and bundling its products. In response to the complaint, IMS filed multiple counterclaims alleging that Symphony poached IMS employees to steal IMS’s trade secrets. Symphony then filed a motion to dismiss IMS’s counterclaims.
After reviewing Symphony’s motion to dismiss, Judge McHugh dismissed IMS’s trade secret misappropriation claims as to two former IMS employees as barred by res judicata. Specifically, a prior consent order already addressed concerns that Symphony gained access to IMS’s trade secrets through the two former IMS employees. Judge McHugh also dismissed IMS’s claim of tortious interference regarding a vendor because IMS’s “prediction” of future harm could not sustain its claim.
However, Judge McHugh let IMS’s poaching claims go forward and refused to dismiss IMS’s claims of improper procurement of confidential information and unfair competition. As to improper procurement, Judge McHugh highlighted IMS’s allegation that its former employee hired by Symphony made a public presentation with IMS materials. With respect to unfair competition, Judge McHugh ruled that IMS had stated facts sufficient to support its claim when it alleged that “Symphony targeted for hire groups of employees who worked in parts of IMS’s business that Symphony wished to duplicate, with the purpose of appropriating IMS’s trade secrets.”
Addressing for the first time whether a patent holder under a contractual duty to deal is also subject to an antitrust duty to deal, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of a putative antitrust class action challenge to a drug manufacturer’s refusal to fully supply competitors’ requested quantities under patent settlement agreements. In re Adderall XR® Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 13-1232 (2d Cir., June 9, 2014) (Sack, J.).
The defendants, Shire, hold patents covering Adderall XR. Previously, Shire sued generic drug manufacturers Teva and Impax for patent infringement after those manufacturers—seeking U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval to produce generic Adderall XR—argued that Shire’s patents were “invalid or will not be infringed.” Shire settled with Teva and Impax in 2006 with variants of the traditional reverse-payment agreement. In these settlement agreements, Teva and Impax agreed to stay out of the Adderall XR market for three years (even if FDA approval came earlier), but unlike a traditional reverse-payment agreement (where the patent holder pays money to the potential entrant), Shire agreed to grant licenses starting in 2009 for making and selling the drug and, if FDA approval had not yet occurred, to supply Teva and Impax’s requirements of unbranded Adderall XR for resale. The 2d Circuit summarized the arrangement as follows: “Shire undertook to give its competitors both the rights and the supplies necessary to participate in the market for [AdderallXR].” By the time Shire’s contractual exclusivity expired, the FDA had not approved either Teva or Impax’s applications, so Teva and Impax began purchasing from Shire. Shortly thereafter, both companies alleged that Shire breached the settlement agreement obligations by refusing to fully fulfil their requirement orders. However, both companies eventually settled with Shire.
In the present case, drug wholesaler and plaintiff Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company (LWD) brought a putative class action against Shire. It alleged antitrust violations stemming from the effect of the supply shortfall on the prices the proposed class of drug wholesalers paid. LWD argued that Shire’s “ordinary breach of contract” became “an unlawful act of monopolization” because, by entering into the agreements, Shire “relinquish[ed] its monopoly control over” Adderall XR vis-à-vis Teva and Impax and thereby created a “duty to deal” with its competitors under the Supreme Court’s 1985 Aspen Skiing decision. Specifically, LWD alleged that Shire artificially inflated prices by holding back some of its supply from generic manufacturers/patent licensees Teva and Impax, from whom LWD purchased Adderall XR. After the district court dismissed the complaint on a R. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, LWD appealed.
The 2d Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, concluding that LWD’s “allegations amount to the self-defeating claim that Shire monopolized the market by ceding its monopoly” and that “the complaint does little more than attach antitrust ‘labels and conclusions’ to what is, at most, an ordinary contract dispute to which the plaintiffs are not even parties.” The court reasoned that “‘the sole exception to the broad right of [...]
On Monday, June 23, 2014, a Federal Judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for five pharmaceutical companies on horizontal conspiracy claims brought by Apotex Inc. and direct purchaser and end payor plaintiffs regarding the popular narcolepsy drug Provigil. Provigil’s key ingredient is modafinil, “a wakefulness-promoting agent” used to treat sleep disorders like narcolepsy. Apotex and the Provigil buyers claimed that Cephalon, Inc. unlawfully restrained trade and maintained a monopoly on modafinil sales by facilitating a horizontal conspiracy through reverse payment settlements with generic-drug manufacturers.
Cephalon, which manufacturers Provigil, entered into reverse payment settlements (also known as “pay-for-delay”) between 2005-2008 to settle patent infringement litigation with Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd, Mylan Inc., and Barr Laboratories, Inc. Although Judge Mitchell Goldberg previously held the plaintiffs’ claims were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, on summary he judgment he found insufficient evidence of a conspiracy.
Judge Goldberg held that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of the alleged hub-and-spoke conspiracy. He reasoned that evidence of “conscious parallelism” among the defendants’ behavior was not enough to levy an antitrust claim when equally plausible independent explanations for their behavior exist. For example, the generic-drug manufacturers were separately compensated and some would receive favored treatment regarding royalty rates. The “pay-for-delay” settlement agreements also created contingent launch provisions, reassuring generic companies that they would not lose the opportunity to launch if another generic-drug manufacturer obtained an earlier date. Had the agreements been contrary to the generic-drug manufacturers’ self-interest, the claims would have more closely resembled noteworthy hub-and-spoke conspiracy cases.
Judge Goldberg cautioned, however, that the court’s opinion does not address the legality of each individual “pay-for-delay” settlement agreements between Cephalon and the generic-drug manufacturers. The Federal Trade Commission is separately challenging the settlements under antitrust law.
Subscribe
