Antitrust regulators in the United States and Europe were very active in the final quarter of 2018 closing a large number of cases requiring in-depth investigations. In the United States, regulators continue their focus on the potential need to update their methods of reviewing high-tech transactions with public hearings on the future of antitrust enforcement.
In Europe, recent reviews of Takeda’s acquisition of Shire and the creation of a joint venture between Daimler and BMW show a focus on how transactions will impact innovation for new products.
The US Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Competition announced the launch of a new Technology Task Force that will investigate anticompetitive conduct, review past transactions, as well as contribute to pending merger reviews. The FTC’s investigation of consummated transactions will not be limited to large transactions that meet the HSR filing thresholds, but will also include so-called “non-reportable” transactions. The launch of this task force along with the ongoing FTC Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century is further evidence of US antitrust enforcers’ increasing focus on the technology sector.
WHAT HAPPENED:
On February 26, the FTC’s Bureau of Competition announced the creation of a Technology Task Force dedicated to monitoring competition in US technology markets. The mandate is expansive allowing for investigations of anticompetitive conduct, mergers and industry practices.
Importantly, the task force is not only charged with aiding in the review of prospective mergers, but also investigating consummated mergers of any size. For consummated mergers, the task force has the authority to reconsider prior matters and seek the full set of remedies (e.g., divestiture, licensing, etc.) that would be available during the review of a prospective transaction.
Patricia Galvan, currently the Deputy Assistant Director of the Mergers III Division, and Krisha Cerilli, currently Counsel to the Director, will lead the task force. Their team includes approximately 17 existing staff attorneys with experience in complex technological markets such as online advertising, social networking and mobile operating systems.
Bureau of Competition Director Bruce Hoffman explained that “by centralizing [the FTC’s] expertise and attention, the new task force will be able to focus on these markets exclusively—ensuring they are operating pursuant to the antitrust laws, and taking action where they are not.”
WHAT THIS MEANS:
The launch of the Technology Task Force together with the ongoing FTC Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century highlights the FTC’s and DOJ’s increasing focus on maintaining “free and fair competition” in the technology sector.
FTC Chairman Joseph Simons’s prior work at the FTC involved launching the Merger Litigation Task Force, which focused on hospital merger retrospectives, and sharpened the FTC’s approach in challenging health care transactions. This appears to be a similar move to sharpen the FTC’s knowledge and approach, but now directed at the technology sector.
Technology companies that have recently completed mergers should take care not to draw scrutiny from antitrust enforcers.
Typically, investigations of consummated transactions and anticompetitive conduct will begin with a review of publicly available materials before burdening targets with compulsory process and seeking information from customers, competitors and industry experts.
Upon receiving information requests from the FTC, targets of the investigations should engage quickly to understand the scope and focus of the investigation. An information request likely means the FTC investigation has progressed beyond the initial phase.
Industry participants (competitors, customers) could also receive significant information associated with FTC investigations. Those parties should also engage with the FTC quickly to jointly develop a reasonable plan for addressing [...]
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) recently sued former joint venture partners because they allegedly coordinated their competitive activities beyond the legitimate scope of their venture. This case illustrates several important points. First, companies who collaborate through joint ventures and similar arrangements need to be mindful that any legitimate collaborative activity does not “spill over” to restrain competition in other unrelated areas. Second, DOJ discovered the conduct during its review of documents produced in connection with a merger investigation. This is the most recent reminder of how broad ranging discovery in merger investigations can result in wholly unrelated conduct investigations and lawsuits. Third, one of the parties was a portfolio company of a private equity sponsor, highlighting how private investors can be targeted for antitrust violations. (more…)
McDermott’s Annual EU Competition Review summarizes key developments in EU competition rules. During the previous year, several new regulations, notices and guidelines were issued by the European Commission. There were also many interesting cases decided by the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union. All these new rules and judicial decisions may be relevant for your company and your day-to-day practice.
In our super-connected age, we can be inundated by information from numerous sources and it is difficult to select what is really relevant to one’s business. The purpose of this review is to help general counsel and their teams to be aware of the essential updates.
This review was prepared by the Firm’s European Competition Team in Brussels, Paris and Germany.
On 16 January 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed the appeal by the European Commission (Commission) against the 2017 judgment of the General Court of the European Union (GCEU). This annuls the Commission’s decision to block the proposed acquisition of TNT Express NV (TNT) by United Parcel Services (UPS) in its entirety (C-265/17 P). The judgment reminds the Commission that it must maintain a balance between the need for speed and the observance of the rights of the defence in merger proceedings.
IN DEPTH
Background
By decision on 30 January 2013, the Commission blocked the proposed acquisition of TNT by UPS (Case M.6570).
On 7 March 2017, the GCEU annulled the Commission’s decision in its entirety on the grounds that (i) the Commission infringed UPS’s rights of defence by failing to communicate to UPS the final version of an econometric model on which it relied in its prohibition decision and that (ii) UPS might have been better able to defend itself if it had at its disposal the final version of that model.
The Commission challenged the GCEU judgment before the CJEU. First, the Commission argued that it was not required to communicate the final econometric analysis to UPS. Second, the Commission claimed that even if UPS’s rights of the defence had been infringed, the GCEU should have dismissed UPS’s plea alleging infringement of the rights of the defence as ineffective because a significant impediment to effective competition (“SIEC”) could in any event be established in Denmark and the Netherlands without having to rely on the econometric model concerned.
On January 31, the Board of the Mexican Competition Authority—the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE)—approved REMY Holdings International’s acquisition of BorgWarner’s vehicle aftermarket business. However, the companies failed to file and were fined for their misconduct (~$153,134). The fine was less severe because the parties voluntarily acknowledged their failure to notify COFECE.
WHAT HAPPENED:
On October 3 2016, BorgWarner Inc. (BorgWarner) agreed to sell its REMY light vehicle aftermarket business to an investor group led by Torque Capital Group. The sale included manufacturing facilities in Mexico, US, Belgium, Tunisia and Hungary. The purchase price was approximately $80 million.
The deal between BorgWarner and REMY exceeded the thresholds provided in the Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE), yet COFECE was not notified of the transaction until October 2018.
Under the LFCE, failure to notify a concentration is considered severe misconduct. The parties’ voluntary acknowledgement of the failure to notify, however, was a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate fine.
In light of the above, the COFECE fined each party MXN 1,460,800 (~$75,230).
WHAT THIS MEANS:
For transactions having an impact in the Mexican territory, it is advisable to verify whether a COFECE filing is required. While the fines in this matter were limited, COFECE fines can be very significant.
Failure to notify a concentration can be fined with up to five percent of the parties’ turnover.
In addition, the COFECE will analyze the impact of the transaction. If the COFECE finds that the transaction harms competition, the transaction will be deemed illicit and the parties may face additional fines of up to eight percent of their turnover.
In determining the amount of the fines, the COFECE will consider mitigating circumstances, such as the parties´ voluntary recognition of the infringement.
This decision is another example of the importance of performing an international antitrust filing assessment (often referred to as a multi-jurisdiction assessment or “Multi-J”) in all transactions having an international component. Antitrust agencies worldwide are increasing their focus on failures to notify and gun jumping generally. Last July, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission brought its first ever gun jumping case against Cryosite and Cell Care Australia. Similarly, in April, the European Commission imposed a record fine of EUR 124.5 million on Altice for implementing its acquisition of PT Portugal before notification or approval by the Commission.
The European Commission recently reaffirmed that industrial policy objectives have no role to play when it comes to applying the EU merger control rules. Despite unusually intense industrial and political pressure to get the Siemens/Alstom railway merger done, Competition Commissioner Vestager has forcefully reiterated that the substantive test under the EU Merger Regulation remains exclusively competition based.
On January 28, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that it had accepted a proposed settlement with office supply distributors Staples and Essendant in connection with Staples’ proposed $482.7 million acquisition of Essendant. The settlement suggests that the FTC is currently more willing than the US Department of Justice (DOJ) to accept conduct remedies to resolve competitive issues raised by vertical mergers.
WHAT HAPPENED:
The FTC Commissioners voted 3-2 to accept a proposed settlement establishing a firewall to prevent Staples from receiving competitively sensitive customer information from Essendant.
Staples is the largest reseller of office products in the US, and one of only two retail office supply superstores in the US. Essendant is one of only two nationwide office product wholesale distributors. In September 2018, Staples agreed to acquire Essendant.
Staples competes with various resellers to sell office supplies to mid-sized companies. Many of those resellers rely on Essendant as their wholesale distributor. In that role, resellers have to provide Essendant with detailed information about their end customers’ identities, purchasing history, product preferences and similar data.
The FTC alleged in its complaint that the transaction was likely to harm competition by giving Staples access to the commercially sensitive information (CSI) of Essendant’s resellers and those resellers’ end customers. The FTC contended that access to that information could allow Staples to offer higher prices than it otherwise would when bidding against a reseller for an end customer’s business.
To address this competitive concern, the FTC imposed a conduct remedy. Specifically, the FTC required the parties to establish a firewall limiting Staples’ access to the CSI of Essendant’s resellers and the end customers of those resellers.
Two FTC Commissioners issued dissenting statements, arguing that the settlement does not fully remedy the transaction’s likely anticompetitive effects. In the dissenters’ view, the evidence suggests that the integrated firm could implement a strategy of raising costs for Staples’ reseller rivals.
WHAT THIS MEANS:
The settlement indicates that the FTC remains willing to cure competitive issues raised by vertical mergers with conduct remedies, such as firewalls, instead of imposing a divestiture or seeking to block the deal.
Under Makan Delrahim’s leadership, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division has been less receptive of conduct remedies, even in vertical merger cases. Delrahim has stated that conduct remedies are fundamentally regulatory and are inconsistent with the DOJ’s role as a law enforcement agency.
The DOJ refused to accept conduct remedies to resolve the competitive issues arising from AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner. DOJ challenged the transaction in federal court. In June 2018, a DC district court judge ruled against the DOJ, and the case is currently on appeal to the DC Circuit.
One of the FTC Commissioners, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, argued in her dissenting statement that the FTC should be more willing to challenge, and seek to block vertical mergers when it identifies competitive concerns. That position is more aligned with the DOJ’s currently stated policy, but overall the FTC appears more willing to accept conduct remedies [...]
Consistent with Assistant Attorney General Delrahim’s speech on September 25, 2018, the DOJ released a new Model Timing Agreement which sets out that it will require fewer custodians, take fewer depositions, and commit to a shorter overall review period in exchange for the provision of detailed information from the merging parties earlier in the Second Request process than has previously been required.
WHAT HAPPENED:
In November, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) published a new Model Timing Agreement (the Model) much like the FTC’s model published earlier this year. Timing agreements are agreements between agency staff and merging parties that outline expected timing for various events (g., production of documents and data, timeline for depositions and front-office meetings if needed) and help provide clarity for the agencies to conduct an orderly investigation during a Second Request.
By providing this Model, the DOJ is signaling that it wants certainty on timing during its Second Request reviews and that this Model is a fast way for the parties and the DOJ to come to agreement on these issues.
Some highlights of the DOJ Model include:
Parties must wait 60 days after substantial compliance to consummate transactions and give 10 days’ notice prior to closing.
The Model limits the number of custodians to 20 per party and depositions to 12 per party, except in extenuating circumstances.
The Model reserves the DOJ’s ability to add 5 more custodians at any time prior to filing a complaint, with the requirement that parties must produce those individual’s responsive documents within 15 days or the agreed timing will be tolled.
For document productions, depending on production method (technology assisted review or linear review), all responsive, non-privileged documents must be produced approximately 30-45 days before substantial compliance. Production of potentially privileged documents ultimately deemed not privileged must be produced approximately 10-25 days before the substantial compliance certification date.
Most data productions are required 30-45 days before substantial compliance.
The Premerger Notification Office (PNO) of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently formalized a new position on Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act) reporting obligations for certain not-for-profit, non-stock transactions. The change is currently in effect and applies to transactions that have not yet closed. The change in position will require reporting of many hospital transactions that have not traditionally been treated as reportable events. The biggest area of change relates to affiliation transactions where hospitals or health systems affiliate under a new parent entity.
Under its previous position, the PNO focused on whether a transaction results in a change of “control” of the board of directors of one or more of the combining entities. Under its new position, the PNO will focus on beneficial ownership–whether one party receives beneficial ownership over the assets of another party as a result of the transaction. Now, a potentially reportable acquisition can occur even when there is no change in the control of the board of directors of one of the combining entities because formal board control is not the exclusive method of obtaining beneficial ownership.
In a recently published Tip Sheet, the PNO provided analysis of reportability for three types of not-for-profit combinations that it regularly sees, which we summarize below. The first two examples involve traditional application of the rules to hospital transactions, while the third example represents the PNO’s newly formed position on affiliations. Note that in all of the examples below, we focus on the nature of the transaction structure to evaluate whether a potentially reportable acquisition of assets has occurred. In any specific transaction, the parties would also need to evaluate whether the statutory thresholds are met (e.g., the $84.4 million size-of-transaction test), as well as whether any exemption applies.
1. A simple acquisition in which an existing acquiring person (g., a not-for-profit hospital) is deemed to hold the assets of the acquired entity (e.g., another not-for-profit hospital) as a result of the acquisition. This can happen in a variety of ways, such as a straight asset acquisition or a transaction in which one not-for-profit becomes the sole corporate member of another. If one not-for-profit obtains the right to manage and operate another through a corporate transaction, that is likely a reportable structure.
a. PNO conclusion: This structure is reportable as an asset acquisition.
2. A transaction in which the existing not-for-profit entities remain independent but form a new joint venture entity as a jointly owned subsidiary or affiliate. The pre-existing entities remain separate persons for HSR Act purposes.
a. PNO conclusion: This structure is reportable. However, the 16 C.F.R. § 802.40 exemption for the formation of a not-for-profit joint venture is likely to apply. b. The illustration below depicts this structure:
3. A transaction in which the existing not-for-profit entities consolidate under a new not-for-profit entity. The existing entities lose [...]
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