Compliance with EU and national antitrust merger control rules can significantly impact the feasibility, timing and costs of M&A transactions. Parties to a proposed transaction in the EU should assess the merger control issues early in the process and evaluate and comply with any procedural antitrust requirements to avoid unnecessary delay, or even civil or criminal penalties, in any EU transactions.
More than 100 countries worldwide have merger control regimes. In the majority of these regimes, including the U.S., EU and most EU Member States, parties to a transaction may not close a deal without approval from the competition antitrust regulator. An infringement of this obligation, or "gun-jumping", carries risks that are generally well understood. But companies should be aware that the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has recently taken a more aggressive approach in its enforcement of gun-jumping, in particular concerning the fining policy for gun-jumping.
The DOJ has released an updated merger remedies guide that provides an overview on how the DOJ Antitrust Division staff will analyze proposed remedies in merger matters. The revised guide places an increased emphasis on behavioral or conduct remedies to address issues raised by vertical transactions.
There is considerable speculation in China that many large transactions that should have been notified for clearance by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) have not been properly notified, and Chinese government is going to go after the concerned concentrating parties. Recently, the speculation came into being and all public comments must be filed before 23 June 2011. New Draft Regulations, “Preliminary Regulations on the Investigation & Treatment of Failure to Report Concentration of Undertakings (Opinion Solicitation Draft),” clarify and provide MOFCOM with the power to investigate, fine and order divestiture of mergers and acquisitions that should have been, but have failed to be, notified and cleared by MOFCOM.
To evaluate the competitive impact of an anti-monopoly review on the market of mergers and acquisitions (or concentration) and to guide business operators when filing notification of a concentration, the Ministry of Commerce of China has introduced Interim Measures on Evaluating Competitive Influence Caused by the Concentration of Business Operators (Draft for Comments) for public comment. The deadline for submission of comments is June 13, 2011.
On Tuesday the FTC published its comments to FERC’s Notice of Inquiry (NOI), in which FERC had asked for comments on whether, (and if so, how), it should revise its approach for examining market power concerns arising from horizontal mergers to reflect the revised 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines published by the FTC and DOJ. The NOI also asked for comments on what impact the revised Merger Guidelines should have on FERC’s analysis of horizontal market power in its electric market-based rate program.
The theme of the FTC’s comments focus on encouraging FERC to adopt the broader set of concepts from the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, not just the revised HHI thresholds, as FERC’s NOI suggests. HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is a measure of market concentration, based on market share analysis. The FTC points out that a "critical thrust" of the 2010 Merger Guidelines is that "merger analysis should examine all dimensions of a transaction’s likely competitive effects," not just market concentration. The FTC cautions that focusing only on HHI calculations can be misleading – either too lenient or too restrictive– especially given characteristics of electricity markets, notably, relatively inelastic demand, capacity-constrained firms, transmission congestion and long-term supply contracts. While market shares are one indicator of competitive effects, other types of evidence include actual effects, direct comparison based on experience, substantial head-to-head competition and the potentially disruptive role of a merging party. The FTC’s comments also note that strict market definition is not the only appropriate starting point for merger analysis, and may not even be required in some circumstances when there is evidence of anticompetitive effects.
If FERC adopts the principles in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FERC’s competition analysis would become similar to the comprehensive competitive effects analysis in FTC and DOJ investigations.
The majority of merger control regimes around the world impose standstill or waiting period requirements for notifiable transactions, e.g. the US, the EU and most EU Member States. If a transaction meets the filing thresholds, it must be notified to the competent antitrust regulator and must not be closed without prior approval by the antitrust regulator or the expiration of the applicable waiting period.
Under German merger control rules, a notifiable merger must not be implemented without prior clearance decision. An infringement of the standstill obligation can (theoretically) lead to fines of up to 10 percent of the group’s worldwide turnover. In addition, the infringement of the standstill obligation renders the contracts ineffective under German merger control rules.
The German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has recently taken a stricter approach to the enforcement of the merger standstill obligation. In the past, the risk of fines was minor if the merger did not lead to any serious competition concerns, if it was the group’s first infringement of the standstill obligation and if the company itself notified the FCO ex post of the implemented merger.
We see now a growing number of decisions imposing fines for the infringement of the standstill obligation (sometimes referred to as "gun jumping" in the United States). In May 2011, in the latest of a string of such decisions, the FCO imposed a substantial fine for infringement of the standstill obligation although the merger did not lead to any serious competition concerns and although the company had itself notified the implemented merger. These facts were only taken into account as mitigating factors for the calculation of the fine.
The European Commission has also recently imposed fines for the infringement of the standstill obligation.
In this changing environment, the filing requirement and the standstill obligation cannot be seen as a pure formality. It is therefore essential to always verify whether and in which jurisdictions a transaction is notifiable – and not to close the deal before the relevant competition authorities have cleared the deal.
On May 10, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil lawsuit against George’s Inc. to block its $3M acquisition of Tyson Foods Inc.’s, Harrisonburg, Virginia chicken processing plant, showing that deals of all sizes face scrutiny. This case also continues the trend of challenges to non-reportable transactions by both the DOJ and FTC, as well as the DOJ’s current focus on the agriculture sector. It is also notable because the DOJ is alleging that the merger leads to monopsony power, a relatively rare allegation, but one that is increasingly used in challenging deals in the agriculture business.
The DOJ began investigating the acquisition when it was announced in mid-March, and issued Civil Investigative Demands to the parties on April 18, 2011. Despite their awareness of the DOJ’s concerns and ongoing data and document productions, the parties consummated the deal.
George’s and Tyson are two of only three chicken processors in the Shenandoah Valley. Chicken processors process and distribute "broilers," which are chickens raised for meat products. The processors compete for contracts with growers, who care for and raise chicks from the time they are hatched until the time they are ready for slaughter.
In its complaint, the DOJ alleges that the relevant product market is the "purchase of broiler grower services from chicken farmers." The DOJ then asserts that, following the proposed merger, chicken farmers would have only a single processor to sell their growing services to – in part because the only other processor in the 50-75 mile range, Pilgrim’s Pride, is at capacity. The DOJ alleges that the consolidation would not only harm grower’s contract prices but also lead to inferior contract terms on other, non-price factors. The DOJ argues that the relevant geographic market is limited to the Shenandoah Valley because of transportation costs for feed and live birds.
In January 2011, the European Commission decided that the proposed merger between Aegean Airlines and Olympic Air should be prohibited because it would have resulted in a quasi-monopoly on the domestic Greek air transport market. This decision shows that traditional airline merger remedies, such as slot releases, are sometimes insufficient to allay concerns of monopolization. It also illustrates that the Commission will take a tough stance on competition policy, even when facing strong political pressure to clear the merger for the sake of the economy.
The European Commission started a public consultation on a draft document which seeks to establish best practices on cooperation between national competition authorities (NCAs) in the EU when reviewing mergers. Although cooperation between NCAs exists already, especially through the European Competition Network (ECN), the best practices seek to formalize the cooperation between NCAs and thus providing more security and predictability for the parties and their legal advisers.
The best practices should enhance cooperation between NCAs in cases where the same merger is assessed by several NCAs because it does not meet the thresholds for review under the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission considers cooperation between NCAs as beneficial not only for the authorities but also for the merging parties: it will speed up the investigation process, reduce burdens on the merging parties and may help NCAs in designing remedies. Particularly in cases where serious concerns about the post merger situation exist, close cooperation between competition authorities will secure a non-conflicting and coherent outcome.
The object of the Commission’s draft is twofold:
First, NCAs should keep each other informed of important developments related to their investigation into the merger. Also, NCAs should liaise in cases where closer cooperation is necessary and keep each other informed about their progress. Most importantly, the Commission proposes that NCAs should in future discuss market definition, theories of harm, empirical evidence and the possible impact of a proposed merger.
Second, the draft also assigns a role to the merging parties. Merging parties should, as far as possible, provide NCAs with information as to where the merger will be filed, the dates of the proposed filing, geographic areas, sectors involved etc. Also, merging parties should assist in ensuring that remedies do not lead to inconsistencies and that such remedies are effective. Of importance is further the proposal that the merging parties, but also third parties, shall – as far as possible – grant waivers of confidentiality so that NCAs actually are permitted to discuss particular issues of a proposed transaction.
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