ANTITRUST ALERT
ANTITRUST ALERT
A Global Resource for Compliance Officers & Legal Advisors
ANTITRUST ALERT
A Global Resource for Compliance Officers & Legal Advisors
Monopolization/Abuse of Dominance
Subscribe to Monopolization/Abuse of Dominance's Posts

Election 2016: Trump on Antitrust

by | Oct 11, 2016 | , , , ,

While antitrust policy and enforcement has not received much attention from Donald Trump on the campaign trail, Mr. Trump has made a few notable statements regarding antitrust law that provide hints as to potential antitrust enforcement priorities for a Trump administration. Mr. Trump’s history as both a plaintiff and defendant in antitrust litigation is also notable and unprecedented.

In his 2011 book Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again, Mr. Trump addressed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) specifically in the context of antitrust law. Under the heading “Sue OPEC” Mr. Trump wrote:

We can start by suing OPEC for violating antitrust laws. Currently, bringing a lawsuit against OPEC is difficult. . . . The way to fix this is to make sure that Congress passes and the president signs the “No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act” (NOPEC) (S.394), which will amend the Sherman Antitrust Act and make it illegal for any foreign governments to act collectively to limit production or set prices. If we get it passed, the bill would clear the way for the United States to sue member nations of OPEC for price-fixing and anti-competitive behavior. . . . Imagine how much money the average American would save if we busted the OPEC cartel. (more…)



read more

Antitrust Enforcement under a Clinton Administration: Status Quo or Significant Change?

by | Oct 10, 2016 | , , , , ,

On Monday, October 3, 2016, Hillary Clinton issued a statement on her website titled “Hillary Clinton’s Vision for an Economy Where our Businesses, our Workers, and Our Consumers Grow and Prosper Together.”

Prior to this statement, there had been some speculation over what a Clinton presidency might bring in terms of antitrust enforcement.

Unlike President Barack Obama, former Secretary Clinton had not issued a clear policy statement on her antitrust position before Monday. She had, however, penned one short op-ed piece for Quartz, and had made some general statements on the campaign trail regarding the problems of industry consolidation. It was unclear from these prior statements whether a Clinton administration would mean any change in the current state of affairs at Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The current administration has challenged a higher percentage of mergers than any administration since before Reagan’s, but it has not significantly altered the law regarding what mergers are considered actionable.

In her Quartz op-ed, Secretary Clinton stated that “we need to fix [the system],” and decried the concentrated markets in the pharmaceutical, airline and telecommunications industries. But Secretary Clinton gave only two concrete examples of how she would “take on the fight” against “large corporations.” (more…)



read more

Third Circuit Blocks Hospital Merger in Key Victory for FTC on Geographic Market Definition

by , , and | Sep 28, 2016 | , , ,

On September 27, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit handed an important victory to the Federal Trade Commission and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a closely watched hospital merger case. The decision provides clear guidance on the appropriate tests for determining geographic markets in hospital merger cases, while also suggesting that efficiencies claimed in many hospital transactions may face increased scrutiny in future cases.

Read “Third Circuit Blocks Hospital Merger in Key Victory for FTC on Geographic Market Definition”



read more

McDermott’s Antitrust M&A Snapshot Published on July 17, 2016

by , and | Jul 27, 2016 | , , , , , ,

McDermott’s Antitrust M&A Snapshot is a resource for in-house counsel and others who deal with antitrust M&A issues but are not faced with these issues on a daily basis. In each quarterly issue, we will provide concise summaries of Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ) and European Commission (EC) news and events related to M&A, including significant ongoing investigations, trials and consent orders, as well as analysis on the trends we see developing in the antitrust review process.

United States: January – June Update

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) have been actively challenging mergers and acquisitions in the first half of 2016. In some instances, the parties abandoned their deal once the FTC or DOJ issued a complaint, in others, the parties entered into consent agreements with the agencies. In matters where a divestiture is an acceptable remedy, the FTC and DOJ have required robust divestitures with financially and competitively viable buyers. There is increasing pressure for broad divestitures and for upfront buyers in industries where the agencies do not have ample experience and where there may not be multiple competitive buyers willing to acquire the assets.

In merger challenges, the agencies have been successful in obtaining preliminary injunctions in Washington, DC, but have been less successful outside of their home court. The agencies have successfully argued price discrimination markets, where sales of products to a narrow group of customers were the market, and courts are accepting the agencies’ narrow market definition. We also see a trend in challenges due to innovation, where the merging parties are the market leaders in new developments and research and development in particular areas. Investigations continue to take many months, with many approaching or exceeding a year.

EU: January – June Update

In the EU, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of notified transactions to the European Commission (from 277 notifications in 2013 to 337 in 2015). Most of these transactions have been cleared by the EU regulator in Phase I without any commitments. However, there have still been a number of antitrust interventions requiring the merging parties to offer, often far-reaching, remedies. One industry has recently seen a particularly high ratio of antitrust intervention is the telecoms sector. For example, in the merger between the mobile operators Telenor and TeliaSonera, the parties abandoned the transaction due to European Commission opposition to the transaction. The European Commission publicly announced that the transaction would not have been cleared, and that the remedies offered by the companies were not convincing. A prohibition decision was also issued, despite the offered remedies, in the failed combination of Telefónica UK’s “O2” and Hutchison 3G UK’s “Three”. This transaction involved the longest merger control review by the European Commission to end up in a prohibition decision (243 calendar days, compared to the average of 157 calendar days to block a deal).

With regard to current trends in merger control remedies at the level of the European Commission, there continues to be [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Polish Competition Authority Supports UBER

by | May 13, 2016 | , ,

On 5 May 2016, the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) published a position paper in which it expressed its opinion on Uber’s operations on the Polish market for transportation services.

UOKiK has been monitoring and analysing the effects of the emergence of such online platforms on the Polish market and concluded that Uber (i) encourages competition, (ii) is beneficial to consumers and (iii) provides for innovative solutions.

(more…)



read more

When Customer Supply Contracts Lead to Trouble: Exclusive Dealing Provisions Result in FTC Monopolization Action against Invibio

by | May 4, 2016 | ,

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) continues to aggressively enforce the antitrust laws. On April 27, 2016, the FTC took action against Victrex, plc and its wholly owned subsidiaries, Invibio, Inc. and Invibio Limited (collectively, Invibio) because of exclusivity terms in its supply contracts. The consent order requires Invibio to cease and desist from enforcing most of the exclusivity terms in its current supply contracts and generally prohibits Invibio from requiring exclusivity in future contracts. Invibio is also prohibited from using other pricing strategies, such as market-share discounts, that would effectively result in exclusivity.

Exclusive dealing by a monopolist may be challenged and prohibited when the acts allow the monopolist to maintain its monopoly power. Total foreclosure is not a requirement for unlawful exclusive dealing—it simply must foreclose competition in a substantial share of the relevant market so as to adversely affect competition.

The FTC’s complaint alleged that Invibio’s exclusive dealing provisions in its customer contracts foreclosed a substantial share of the market from two entrants despite those entrants offering a similar product at lower prices. In addition to using exclusivity terms in its long term supply contracts to impede its competition and maintain its monopoly power in the worldwide market for implant-grade polyetheretherketone (PEEK), the FTC complaint also alleged that Invibio used strategies to “coerce or induce device makers to accede to exclusivity terms, including threatening to discontinue PEEK supply or to withhold access to regulatory support.” (more…)



read more

EU: Merger case cleared following offer of FRAND technology license

by | Apr 25, 2016 | , , , ,

On 20 April 2016, the European Commission (Commission) cleared, under its merger control rules, the acquisition of Equens and PaySquare by Worldline subject to, amongst others, a commitment to license technology to any customer interested, at Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) conditions.

Worldline is a French provider of payment services and terminals, financial processing and software licensing and e-transactions services. Equens offers a number of services across the value chain of both payments processing and cards processing services. Its fully-owned subsidiary, PaySquare, provides merchant acquiring services.  This transaction combines two large payment systems operators, active across the full value chain in both payment processing and card processing services.

The EU antitrust regulator was concerned that the acquisition would have raised certain issues with respect to, in particular, merchant acquiring services in Germany.  The Commission’s market investigation revealed that Worldline’s Poseidon software and modules are used by the majority of German network service providers (including PaySquare), there are no other readily available alternatives to Poseidon and post-transaction, Worldline would have the ability and the incentives to favour its new subsidiary PaySquare, in terms of price and quality, over other network service providers relying on Poseidon.

In order to address the Commission’s concerns, the companies offered a commitment to grant licenses for the Poseidon software on FRAND terms during a period of 10 years. Specifically, this commitment consists of the following elements:

  • The granting of a license for Poseidon and its modules to third-party network service providers under FRAND terms and capping of the maintenance fees
  • A monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with FRAND terms by a licensing trustee and by a group composed of network service providers
  • Giving access to the Poseidon source code under certain conditions
  • Transferring the governance of the ZVT protocol, on which most German point of sale terminals run, to an independent not for profit industry organisation

The Commission’s decision to accept this commitment is interesting for a number reasons; the Commission generally has a strong preference for structural rather than behavioural undertakings, FRAND obligations are typically applicable to technologies that are standardised, and this case presents the first time that a commitment to licence on FRAND terms has been used as a remedy under the EU Merger Regulation.



read more

ICN Adopts New Guidance Focusing on Investigative Process and International Cooperation in Mergers

by | Jun 22, 2015 | , ,

From April 28 through May 1, the International Competition Network (ICN) held its 2015 annual conference. The ICN is a network that unites 132 competition watchdogs from 119 jurisdictions, including the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the European Commission (EC) and the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). Its role is to act as a forum for the global antitrust community and to facilitate dialogue and build consensus on competition policy and practices. Members participate in working groups and produce recommendations once they have reached consensus. Each year, during the annual conference, recommendations are adopted by the members and become best practices or guidance tools that may be implemented by competition authorities across the world.

This year, the ICN adopted several recommended practices including, most notably, “ICN Guidance on Investigative Process” and an “ICN Practical Guide to International Enforcement Cooperation in Mergers.”

Guidance on Investigative Process

The “ICN Guidance on Investigative Process” is the result of discussions held within the Agency Effectiveness Working Group over several years as part of the ICN’s Investigative Process Project co-led by the FTC and the EC. This is the first time the ICN has addressed investigative processes used by competition agencies across all competition enforcement areas. The discussions focused on two prongs: (i) enforcement tools available to competition agencies to obtain relevant information in the course of their investigations, and (ii) the procedures they follow when conducting such investigations. The adopted work product contains a list of key principles and practices which the participants deemed important in order to guarantee an effective and fair investigative process:

  • Investigative tools. Competition authorities should be able to make use of investigative tools, such as requests for information, inspections and interviews. They should have the possibility to obtain information by compulsion if necessary. Such investigative tools should be used in accordance with a legal framework setting out clear criteria, and be subject to both internal checks and balances and external review.
  • Transparency concerning policies and standards. Competition authorities should lay out legal standards and agency policies in formal or informal documents, such as manuals, staff working papers, best practices or guidelines. There is one limit: transparency should not undermine the effectiveness of investigations.
  • Transparency during an investigation. Competition agencies should let parties know as soon as feasible that an investigation has been opened; the legal basis for the investigation; the competitive concerns and the applicable theories of harm; the progress and timing of the investigation; and, once formal allegations are made, the evidence relied upon. The level of transparency may be different depending on the type of investigation.
  • Engagement during an investigation. Competition agencies should provide parties with the possibility to defend themselves against the allegations raised. In doing so, parties should be able to submit factual, legal, and economic evidence in due course. Interested third parties should also be able to submit their views.
  • Confidentiality protection and legal privileges. Parties and third parties should be able to ask [...]

    Continue Reading


read more

Federal Court Finds Amex’s “Anti-Steering” Merchant Rules Anticompetitive

by | Feb 27, 2015 | ,

After a seven-week bench trial in an enforcement action by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 17 state attorneys general, U.S. District Judge Garaufis (Eastern District of New York) held that American Express Co.’s (Amex’s) “anti-steering” rules (Non-Discrimination Provisions or NDPs) are an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  The NDPs in Amex’s agreements with merchants prevent merchants from attempting “to induce or ‘steer’ a customer” from paying with non-AmEx credit cards by, for instance, offering discounts or incentives to customers paying with other cards, even though “the cost of [such] transaction[s] [would likely] be lower for the merchant.”  At bottom, the court’s holding centered on its conclusion that “these NDPs create an environment in which there is nothing to offset [Amex’s incentive] to charge merchants inflated prices [to process transactions, which] results in higher costs to all consumers who purchase goods and services from these merchants.”

In the initial step of its rule-of-reason analysis—DOJ’s burden to demonstrate that the NDPs “have had an ‘adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market,’” which may be met by “establishing that [Amex] had sufficient market power to cause an adverse effect on competition”—the court focused first on market definition, then market power and anticompetitive effects.

Regarding the relevant market, Amex argued that it includes both debit and credit cards.  It distinguished United States v. Visa, where the Second Circuit held that credit cards and debit cards are distinct relevant markets, in light of “the dramatic growth in customers’ use of debit cards” since that 2003 decision.  The court disagreed, finding that “debit cards have not become reasonably interchangeable with [credit] cards or network services in the eyes of credit-accepting merchants, who are the relevant consumers in this case.”  Rather, the court employed a market definition comprising only credit cards, where AmEx holds a 26 percent share.  The court did, however, reject DOJ’s argument for an even smaller submarket, i.e., credit card services for only travel and entertainment merchants (where Amex’s market share is even higher), based on its finding that DOJ failed to show that credit card companies are able to charge discriminatory prices to those merchants.

The court went on to conclude that “Amex’s NDPs have adversely affected competition in the [relevant] market, and [Amex] possesses sufficient market power to cause such effects.”  The court found that Amex “enjoy[s] significant market share in a highly concentrated market with high barriers to entry, and are able to exercise uncommon leverage over their merchant-consumers,” for instance by “imposing significant price increases . . . without any meaningful merchant attrition.”  The court also found actual adverse effects on interbrand competition (i.e., that the NDPs “render[] low-price business models untenable, stunt[] innovation, and result[] in higher prices”), reasoning that the NDPs “deny[] merchants the opportunity to influence their customers’ payment decisions and thereby shift spending to less expensive cards[, such that the NDPs] impede a significant avenue of horizontal interbrand competition in the [...]

Continue Reading



read more

S.D.N.Y. Dismisses Cotton Traders’ § 1 Claims Under Copperweld

by | Oct 17, 2014 | , ,

On September 30, 2014, the Southern District of New York reconsidered the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) and Sherman Act claims brought against Louis Dreyfus Commodities B.V. and its affiliates in In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litigation, 12 Civ. 5126 (ALC)(KNF) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014).  The plaintiffs, cotton futures traders, alleged that the defendants manipulated the price of cotton futures by “unreasonably and uneconomically demanding delivery of certificated cotton in fulfillment of futures contracts,” among other allegations of manipulative behavior.  In December 2013, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, and defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration.  On reconsideration, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1 claim under the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine set forth in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), but declined to dismiss the CEA or § 2 claims.

The court began its analysis by emphasizing the narrow holding of Copperweld.  It noted that Copperweld’s holding was limited to the relationship between “a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary”; where the relationship between two conspirators is anything less than complete ownership, lower courts “must draw from the analysis in Copperweld without the benefit of a bright line rule.”  Cotton, 12 Civ. 5126 at 6-7.  While the court rejected an interpretation of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine that “Section One claims are not viable where the only named coconspirators are a parent corporation and its subsidiaries” as an overstatement of the law, it did not go so far as to hold that the doctrine only applies to parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries.

The five defendants in Cotton were all related through a web of parent-subsidiary relationships.  The plaintiffs did not specify whether each subsidiary was wholly owned, or clearly plead the nature of the defendants’ relationships.  The court held that, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it could not conclude that the allegations supported “a reasonable inference that Defendants ha[d] ‘separate corporate consciousnesses.’”  Cotton, 12 Civ. 5126 at 10.  For the defendants that were not wholly owned by other defendants, “the allegations portray[ed] the other Defendants as having ‘ownership’ and ‘control over’ them and giving ‘directions to’ them.  Nothing in the [complaint] demonstrate[d] a rational possibility that Defendants were ‘previously separate and competing entities [that combined] to act as one for their common benefit.’”  Id.

Regarding the § 2 claim, defendants argued that the court should apply the pleading standards for predatory pricing claims established by the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).  The court disagreed and concluded that Weyerhaeuser was inapplicable to these facts because the case did not present a classic predatory bidding scheme.  Due to the procedural posture of the case, the court did not discuss any additional issues related to defendants’ alleged monopolization.  Though it did not dismiss the § 2 claim, the court noted “the delicate factual balance in which Plaintiffs’ remaining claims hang” and granted defendants leave to move for summary judgment before the plaintiffs could [...]

Continue Reading



read more

BLOG EDITORS

Gregory E. Heltzer

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

Ranked In Chambers USA 2022
US Leading Firm 2022