In May 2024, the European Commission published a Competition Policy Brief classifying certain agreements related to labor markets as serious antitrust infringements. According to the Commission, so-called wage-fixing and no-poach agreements can only be justified in exceptional cases. The Brief follows the first unannounced inspections by the Commission concerning labor market agreements in Germany and Spain in the online meal ordering and delivery industry. It is vital that companies operating in Europe focus on educating their recruiting and human resources departments on antitrust rules to avoid severe fines.

LABOR MARKETS ON THE AGENDA

The Commission’s Competition Policy Brief could be interpreted as a warning for companies exposed to tight labor markets: Restrictive labor market agreements between competitors will be taken as seriously as price-related cartels. Companies must also bear in mind that competitors for labor are not limited to those companies with which they compete to sell products or services. It is sufficient that they compete for the same employees.

Given that restrictions on competition in labor markets mainly affect national markets, the main investigators will be (and already are) national competition authorities.

WHAT AGREEMENTS ARE CAUGHT

The following types of labor market agreements are considered potentially problematic:

  • No-poach agreements: In some cases, employers (in writing or orally) agree not to steal employees from each other. Such agreements can take different forms: In the case of nonsolicitation or no-cold-calling agreements, companies agree not to actively approach the other companies’ employees with a job opportunity. More far-reaching are no-hire agreements, i.e., companies agree not to hire (actively or passively) employees of other parties to the agreement. As a matter of principle, all forms of no-poach agreements in the Commission’s view constitute market sharing (supply-source sharing) within the meaning of Article 101(1)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and therefore form a competition risk to be sanctioned.
  • Wage-fixing agreements: Sometimes, employers agree to fix wages or other types of compensation or benefits for their respective employees. The Commission considers these agreements akin to price fixing within the meaning of Article 101(1)(a) of the TFEU.

The Commission does acknowledge that no-poach agreements may pursue a legitimate objective by incentivizing companies to invest in training their own employees without fearing that they would be later lured away by competitors, and by preventing employees from taking non-patent intellectual property rights (such as trade secrets) to competitors. However, both types of agreements “reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition” such that the Commission does not see a need to examine their effects. Due to their alleged negative impact on employees’ wages, firm productivity and innovation, they are regarded “by their very nature” as harmful.

The above does not apply, however, to collective bargaining agreements between organizations representing employers and employees, which are explicitly outside the scope of the Commission’s Competition Policy Brief. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recognized that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements, which [...]

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