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Clayton Act

Antitrust M&A Snapshot

by McDermott Will & Emery, Jon B. Dubrow and Joel R. Grosberg | Aug 6, 2018 | DOJ Developments, EC Developments, EU Developments, FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions, Monopolization/Abuse of Dominance

United States: April – June 2018 Update

The second quarter of 2018 ushered in a trial defeat for the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the beginning of a new era at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In June, Judge Richard J. Leon of the US District Court for the District of Columbia denied the DOJ’s requested injunction of the AT&T/Time Warner acquisition. The case marked the first litigated vertical challenge by the Antitrust Division in nearly 40 years. DOJ filed a notice of appeal of the district court’s decision. At the FTC, four new commissioners were sworn in in May, with a fifth to join upon the approval of current commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen to the US Court of Federal Claims. With the transition nearly complete, new FTC Chairman Joseph Simons announced plans to re-examine and modernize the FTC’s approach to competition and consumer protection laws, possibly charting a new course for FTC antitrust enforcement.

EU: April – June 2018 Update

In this quarter, we saw two significant developments concerning the issue of gun-jumping. First, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified the scope of the gun-jumping prohibition, ruling that a gun-jumping act can only be regarded as the implementation of a merger if it contributes to a change in control over the target. Second, the European Commission (EC) imposed a €124.5 million fine on Altice for having breached the notification and the standstill obligations enshrined in the EUMR by gun-jumping. The EC also issued two clearance decisions following Phase II investigations in the area of information service activities and the manufacture of basic metals. (more…)

Antitrust M&A Snapshot

by McDermott Will & Emery, Jon B. Dubrow and Joel R. Grosberg | May 7, 2018 | DOJ Developments, EC Developments, EU Developments, FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

United States: January – March 2018 Update

One year into the Trump administration, the US antitrust agencies are finally starting to implement their enforcement policies. Most notably, trial began in the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) challenge of the AT&T/Time Warner merger, which is the Antitrust Division’s first significant vertical challenge in several decades. Judge Richard J. Leon’s opinion in that case could alter the outlook for several other vertical transactions pending before the agencies. While the DOJ was preparing for trial, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was preparing for a transition to five new commissioners, who were approved by the Senate in April. It remains unclear whether the new, Republican-led FTC will be more moderate in its enforcement efforts, similar to prior Republican administrations, or will follow in the footsteps of President Trump’s DOJ, which has been surprisingly aggressive.

EU: January – March 2018 Update

The European Commission (EC) continued to be quite active in the first quarter of 2018, clearing five mergers. The most significant decision was the approval of a megamerger in the agrochemical sector—Bayer/Monsanto—where the parties submitted a remedy package that totalled over €6 billion. This remedy package included divestitures of research and development assets that addressed the EC’s concerns about innovation, similar to the EC’s Dow/DuPont clearance last year. In addition to Bayer/Monsanto, two other proposed acquisitions in the chemicals sectors fell through, most notably Celanese/Blackstone, due to excessive divestiture requests required by the Commission. (more…)

THE LATEST: Trump DOJ’s Next Target: the Illinois Brick Indirect Purchaser Rule?

by McDermott Will & Emery and Mary Strimel | Feb 2, 2018 | Cartel Enforcement, DOJ Developments, Private Litigation

In the course of one week, two top level DOJ Antitrust officials in the Trump Administration separately spoke at panels and suggested the possibility of a sea change in federal antitrust law with respect to indirect purchaser lawsuits. The comments further reinforce the Administration’s active focus on antitrust issues.

WHAT HAPPENED:

Makan Delrahim, DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division (the Division), spoke at a conference organized by the Antitrust Research Foundation on January 19, 2018, and is reported to have stated that the Division was looking into the possibility of pursuing civil damages on behalf of taxpayers in antitrust price-fixing suits.
A few days later, on January 23, 2018, Andrew Finch, DOJ’s Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, spoke at a Heritage Foundation conference and reportedly stated that the Division was “looking at whether or not it might be worthwhile to revisit those rules and suggest the same to the Supreme Court,” referencing the landmark decision Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which prohibits indirect purchasers from recovering antitrust damages under federal antitrust law.

(more…)

FTC Increases Notification Thresholds under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and Clayton Act Section 8

by McDermott Will & Emery and Jon B. Dubrow | Jan 29, 2018 | FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

The US Federal Trade Commission recently announced increased thresholds for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 and for determining whether parties trigger the prohibition against interlocking directors under Section 8 of the Clayton Act.

Senate Democrats Push for Tougher Merger Enforcement

by Gregory E. Heltzer, Louise Aberg and Lisa A. Peterson | Sep 18, 2017 | DOJ Developments, FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

On September 14, 2017, Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), introduced new legislation to curtail market concentration and enhance antitrust scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions. As the Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, Klobuchar is the leading Senate Democrat for antitrust issues.

Two bills were submitted to the Senate: the Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act (CPCPA) and the Merger Enforcement Improvement Act (MEIA). The CPCPA is co-sponsored by Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Ed Markey (D-MA). The MEIA is co-sponsored by Senators Blumenthal, Markey and Gillibrand, along with Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Al Franken (D-MN), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Mazie Hirono (D-HI) and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI). Both bills propose amendments to the Clayton Act. Earlier this year, Senate democrats announced these legislative proposals as part of their “A Better Deal” antitrust agenda.

WHAT DO THE BILLS PROPOSE:

Notably, the CPCPA proposes to revise the Clayton Act so that in challenging an acquisition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) would only have to show that the proposed transaction materially lessens competition rather than significantly lessens competition, which is the current standard. The legislation defines “materially lessens competition” to mean “more than a de minimis amount.” This change would reduce the burden of proof for the government in challenging an acquisition.

(more…)

Notification Threshold Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Increased to $80.8 Million

by Jon B. Dubrow | Jan 26, 2017 | FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

Pursuant to the amendments passed by the US Congress in 2000, the FTC announced revised thresholds for HSR pre-merger notifications on January 19, 2017. These increased thresholds will become effective 30 days following publication in the Federal Register. These new thresholds apply to any transaction completed and any HSR pre-merger notifications filed on or after the effective date, expected in late February.

Read the full article here.

Breaking The Health Company Compliance Program Monopoly

by Michael W. Peregrine and Stephen Wu | Sep 20, 2016 | Healthcare Antitrust

The ultimate effectiveness of the corporate compliance program depends on its ability to mitigate risks arising from all substantive laws materially affecting the company — not only the most visible or notorious ones. Yet, both experience and impression suggest that many health company compliance programs are primarily focused on addressing concerns arising from the anti-fraud and abuse, self-referral and reimbursement rules. This level of focus is understandable, given the historical prominence of these rules and the strong public voice of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General. However, such program imbalance can itself lead to significant compliance concerns given the increasing extent to which the civil and criminal antitrust laws are applied to the health care sector.

The fundamental purpose of a corporate compliance program is to detect the particular types of misconduct most likely to occur in a particular corporation’s line of business. The parameters of most programs are based upon the core “effectiveness” principles set forth in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.[1] Specific details of particular programs often reflect guidance provided by regulators with particular interest in certain industries. For example, the compliance programs of many health industry companies follow DHHS regulations that set forth basic principles of such programs, and specific anti-fraud elements that companies should consider when designing and implementing their programs.

Read the full article here.

DOJ Continues to Monitor Interlocking Corporate Directorates with Restructuring of Tullett Prebon’s Acquisition of ICAP

by McDermott Will & Emery | Aug 2, 2016 | DOJ Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

On July 14, 2016, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the restructuring of a planned $1.5 billion transaction between Tullett Prebon Group Ltd. (Tullett Prebon) and ICAP plc adequately addresses the DOJ’s concerns that the transaction would violate Section 8 of the Clayton Act by creating an interlocking directorate. The parties restructured their transaction after the DOJ issued a Second Request to adequately investigate the parties post-closing ownership structure. The DOJ’s investigation of this transaction should serve as a warning for companies considering transactions with competitors where the parties will continue to compete post-merger: the antitrust agencies are going to extensively review any corporate governance structures which could be seen as creating a “cozy relationship” between competitors.

Section 8 of the Clayton Act generally prohibits representatives of a corporation from serving on the board of directors of a competitor corporation. This provision of the Clayton Act, which seeks to prevent the sharing of competitively sensitive information through director communications, continues to be rigorously enforced by the antitrust agencies since the FTC’s 2009 investigation of individuals serving on the boards of multiple large technology companies.

Last year, Tullett Prebon agreed to purchase ICAP’s global hybrid voice broking and information business. Voice broking involves speaking to clients on the phone to negotiate prices and facilitate business. The alternative to voice broking is electronic broking where prices are put on a platform and customers can transact without the need for a human broker. Voice broking is typically used for illiquid assets, whereas electronic broking is used more often in highly liquid markets. By selling its voice broking business, ICAP sought to focus on its electronic trading services.

As originally structured, the transaction would have resulted in ICAP owning 19.9 percent of Tullett Prebon and having the right to nominate one member of Tullett Prebon’s board of directors. This structure was problematic for the DOJ due to the fact that ICAP and Tullett Prebon would continue to compete post-merger in non-voice broking platforms. This led to the DOJ issuing a Second Request, which was focused on post-closing shareholding and governance arrangements.

After the restricting of the transaction, ICAP will not retain any ownership in Tullett and will not have the ability to appoint any directors. This new structure will allow the parties to be “actually independent of each other” according to Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse. “As originally proposed this deal would have violated [a] core principle – creating a cozy relationship among competitors.”

Companies considering transactions with competitors where the parties will continue to compete should exercise caution in their ownership structures and corporate governance post-closing. Any arrangements which can be interpreted as allowing the parties to share information or create a conflict of interest will be closely examined by antitrust regulators and may lead to extended reviews.

FTC Competition Chief Defends Stand-Alone Section 5 Use in Unfair Competition Cases

by Young Cynn | Mar 16, 2015 | FTC Developments

In a blog post last Friday, Debbie Feinstein, Director of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), defended the agency’s use of FTC Act Section 5 to target unfair methods of competition outside the scope of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.

While the use of Section 5 in consumer protection cases has long been established, many, including U.S. Congress members and FTC Commissioners, have urged the FTC in recent years to issue clearer guidelines on how Section 5 will be used to target conduct related to unfair methods of competition. Feinstein suggested that those interested in the FTC’s future use of Section 5 “should look at what the Commission has done and the reason it gave for acting to stop the behavior. . . . The touchstone of every stand-alone Section 5 claim . . . is likely or actual harm to competition or the competitive process.”

Feinstein pointed specifically to invitation to collude cases as a prime example of the type of conduct prosecuted in a stand-alone Section 5 action. The FTC first brought an invitation to collude case in the early 1990s, see Quality Trailer Products, 115 F.T.C. 922 (1992), in which Quality Trailer Products employees visited a competitor and urged it to raise its prices while stating that Quality Trailer would also raise prices. Since that time, the FTC has continued to use Section 5 to bring actions in invitation to collude cases. Most recently, the FTC brought complaints against two internet resellers of UPC barcodes in July 2014, alleging they had sent messages to one of their competitors proposing a scheme to raise their prices in line with the prices of another competitor. Feinstein suggested that the large number of cases brought unanimously by the Commissioners “demonstrates that we are using our stand-alone Section 5 authority responsibly.”

Feinstein also noted that nearly all stand-alone Section 5 cases brought by the FTC have resulted in an injunctive remedy — “I want to underscore that the Commission’s policy is not to seek disgorgement in stand-alone Section 5 cases. . . . Without the threat of a monetary penalty (let alone treble damages), I find it hard to understand the claim that significant procompetitive conduct is chilled by the possibility that the FTC may use its stand-alone Section 5 authority in some unforeseen way.”

Foreign Airlines Move to Dismiss Rate-Fixing Litigation

by Emily Townsend | Jan 16, 2015 | Cartel Enforcement, Private Litigation

Last Friday, foreign cargo carriers filed motions to dismiss an air freight price-fixing suit brought by Schenker AG, the logistics division of Germany’s national railway company, Deutsche Bahn, in the Eastern District of New York. Schenker AG v. Societe Air France, et al., case number 1:14-cv-04711. In its complaint filed last August, Schenker alleged that seven foreign airlines conspired to fix surcharge rates for various air cargo routes to, from and within the United States. This suit is just the latest in a series of investigations and claims concerning anticompetitive behavior in the air cargo industry, which began in 2006 when the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), in conjunction with the European Commission and South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission, organized raids of the offices of numerous air carriers around the world. Airlines have paid billions of dollars in fines to competition agencies throughout the world and nearly a billion more dollars in settlements to direct purchaser plaintiffs in a multi-district litigation in U.S. federal court.

Defendants All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. and Cargolux Airlines International S.A. moved the district court to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens under the Second Circuit’s precedent in Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1998). According to these defendants, Schenker’s choice of forum should be afforded little deference because Schenker is a foreign corporation that was forum shopping, choosing the United States for its treble damages. Instead, defendants argued that Germany was an adequate alternative forum, especially given that Schenker is owned by the German government and that many of the witnesses and documents are located in Europe. In addition, defendant Qantas filed a separate motion to dismiss on the basis that Schenker filed its claims after the Clayton Act’s four year statute of limitations had run. Qantas argued that if Schenker had performed the requisite due diligence, then it would have been aware of its claims on February 15, 2006, the day after which it was reported that the DOJ organized the raids of the airlines. Even considering that the statute of limitations was tolled until May 2011 when Schenker opted out of the middle-district class action against the airlines, Qantas contended that Schenker had to file its complaint before June 1, 2014, which the plaintiff failed to do.

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