In a spectacular turn, on September 3, 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union annulled the European Commission’s decision to review the acquisition of Grail by Illumina. The Commission had previously asserted its authority to examine the merger under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation, despite the transaction not meeting the EU or national turnover thresholds for review.
This ruling is significant because it challenges the Commission’s ability to review transactions that do not meet the relevant EU or national thresholds but are referred by EU Member States. This could impact how future mergers are reviewed within the EU, as the Commission is likely to find alternative ways to review transactions that do not meet the relevant EU or national thresholds.
The European Commission recently adopted and published a package to simplify the procedures for reviewing concentrations under the EU Merger Regulation. The goal of the package is to simplify merger review procedures, with a targeted 25% reduction on reporting requirements.
In the United States, the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) challenge of American Airlines and JetBlue’s “Northeast Alliance” after the joint venture’s approval by the US Department of Transportation earlier this year demonstrates the Biden administration’s commitment to aggressive antitrust enforcement. US President Joe Biden issued an Executive Order calling for tougher antitrust enforcement, including “encouraging” the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to modify the horizontal and vertical merger guidelines to address increasing consolidation. At the same time, the FTC, under Chair Lina Khan, continues its rapid pace of change to the merger review process.
Under a new interpretation of Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), the European Commission (Commission) asserted jurisdiction over Illumina’s acquisition of GRAIL and Facebook’s acquisition of Kustomer, even though the transactions did not meet the Commission or Member State filing thresholds. The EU General Court confirmed a significant gun-jumping fine imposed on Altice for breach of the EUMR notification and standstill obligations.
In the United Kingdom, the UK government published plans to update antitrust rules, including revising its jurisdictional thresholds and expanding the “share of supply” test to allow the CMA to more easily capture vertical and conglomerate mergers, as well as acquisitions of startups. And the Competition & Markets Authority’s (CMA) handling of the Veolia/Suez transaction demonstrates the CMA’s willingness to engage with parties to seek practical interim solutions while it is investigating a consummated transaction for potential antitrust concerns.
In the United States, aggressive antitrust enforcement is likely to continue with the appointment of Lina Khan as Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chair and the nomination of Jonathan Kanter to lead the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division. The premerger notification landscape continues to shift as filings reach another record high. Technology companies remain in the “hot seat” as legislators in the US House of Representatives introduced five antitrust reform bills that would change the enforcement landscape for digital platforms, including seeking to preclude large digital platform companies from acquiring smaller, nascent competitors. And the US Department of Justice is making good on President Biden’s pledge to regulate “Big Ag” by challenging Zen-Noh Grain Corporation’s proposed acquisition of 38 grain elevators from Bunge North America, Inc.
Meanwhile, in Q1 2021, the European Commission (Commission) published its Guidance on Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. The Guidance encourages the EU Member States to refer certain transactions to the Commission even if the transaction is not notifiable under the laws of the referring Member State(s). In Q2, not long after the issuance of the Guidance, the Commission received its first referral request to assess the proposed acquisition of GRAIL by Illumina. In light of the growing global debate on the need for more effective merger control, EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager confirmed that the Commission will not soften EU merger policy going forward. The Commission’s statement was made despite the fact no deals have been blocked by the Commission in about the last two years.
Antitrust regulators in the United States and Europe were very active in the final quarter of 2019. The FTC and DOJ continue to investigate and challenge M&A transactions in a variety of industries. Events of this quarter highlight the importance of states in merger enforcement. As well, recent FTC activity highlights the regulators’ focus on preventing monopolists from buying nascent competitors.
In Europe, the UK CMA continues to expand its role as a key jurisdiction in the merger clearance process, which will only accelerate with Brexit. The EC agreed to clear, subject to conditions, acquisitions in the aluminum production and battery industries as well as in the wholesale supply and retail distribution of TV channels after conducting Phase II reviews. Moreover, the EC opened new in-depth investigations into transactions in the copper refining and engineering sectors.
McDermott’s Annual European Competition Review summarizes key developments in European competition rules. During the previous year, several new regulations, notices and guidelines were issued by the European Commission. There were also many interesting cases decided by the General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union. All these new rules and judicial decisions may be relevant for your company and your day-to-day practice.
In our super-connected age, we can be inundated by information from numerous sources and it is difficult to select what is really relevant to one’s business. The purpose of this review is to help general counsel and their teams to be aware of the essential updates.
This review was prepared by the Firm’s European Competition Team in Brussels and Paris. Throughout 2019 they have monitored legal developments and drafted the summary reports.
As reported previously, German competition law was recently amended. The amendments included with the introduction of a “size of transaction”-threshold a notable change with respect to German merger control. The following is a reminder of five important features of German merger control which you should be aware of:
The jurisdictional thresholds of German merger control are easily triggered
German merger control applies if the parties to a transaction (usually the acquirer and the target) exceeded, in the last financial year, certain turnover thresholds. In an international context, these thresholds are relatively low and easily triggered:
Joint worldwide turnover of all parties > € 500 million, and
German turnover of at least one party > € 25 million, and
German turnover of another party > € 5 million.
There is a new “size of transaction”-threshold
Since June 2017, German merger control can also be triggered if a newly introduced “size of transaction”-threshold is exceeded:
Joint worldwide turnover of all parties > € 500 million, and
German turnover of at least one party > € 25 million, and
“value of compensation” > € 400 million, and
The target company has “significant business activities” in Germany (which may be activities with revenues < € 5 million).
The “value of compensation” includes the purchase price and all other assets and non-cash benefits, as well as liabilities assumed by the purchaser.
Acquisition of minority shareholdings may be notifiable
Similar to the HSR Act, but different to European Union merger control and most European jurisdictions, German merger control is not limited to the “acquisition of control”. Additional triggering events are
The acquisition of 25% or more of the shares in a company, and
The acquisition of a shareholding below 25% if this, combined with other factors (e.g. the right to appoint one out of five members of the board), may have an impact on competition (“acquisition of ability to exercise competitively significant influence”).
Review of joint venture situations
German merger control may apply in joint venture situations that are often not covered by other merger control laws:
German merger control may apply to the setting up of a joint venture company, even if the joint venture will have no activities in Germany. The jurisdictional thresholds may be satisfied by the parent companies alone. While there is an exemption for transactions with “no effect in Germany”, it is interpreted very narrowly and applies only in exceptional circumstances.
German merger control applies to all joint venture situations where two or more parties acquire or continue to hold a shareholding of 25% or more. Examples: – A and B set up a 50/50 production joint venture. – A acquires sole control and a 70% shareholding, and B acquires a non-controlling 30% shareholding. – A sells 75% of a fully owned subsidiary to B, and retains only a 25% minority shareholding. – A, B and C each own 1/3 in a joint venture company. C divests his shareholding [...]
This article, published in Getting the Deal Through, reviews the legislation that creates the pharmaceutical regulation framework in Italy, particularly with regard to mergers and acquisitions, anticompetitive conduct, product development and licensing agreements, and marketing agreements.
In the European Union (EU), at the inception of a joint venture (JV), parent companies must determine whether the newly created structure presents a full-functionality nature, which depends on its degree of autonomy. The answer to this question will determine the legal framework applicable to it.
On the one hand, if the JV is full-function it will fall within the scope of the EU Merger Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004), assuming that the turnover thresholds set out in the Regulation are met. Under these circumstances, the European Commission (EC) will assess the impact of the JV on competition on an ex ante basis.
On the other hand, if the JV is not full-function and takes the form of a partnership formalized by a legal structure to a large extent dependent on its parent companies, the creation of a JV will not have to be notified but the EC may operate a control ex post, in the light of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU which prohibits anticompetitive agreements between undertakings. In such a context, it is up to the parent companies creating a JV to determine whether their JV is compatible with competition law rules.
The ex post control has the advantage of avoiding the notification process that delays the implementation of the JV. However, within that framework, companies may not obtain a clearance decision and the fate of their JV is subject to legal uncertainty. It is thus generally preferable for companies to make sure that their JV will fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation because a clearance decision is irrevocable and unlimited.
In Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission, the European Court of Justice ruled on 29 September 2011 that Elf Aquitaine was not jointly and severally liable as a parent company for the involvement of its wholly owned subsidiary in the cartel for monochloroaecetic acid. Taken with a number of recent judgments, this suggests that European courts are getting tougher with the Commission on parental liability.
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