In an announcement made on 10 September 2014, the President-elect of the next European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker from Luxemburg, unveiled his team and announced that Magrethe Vestager from Denmark will replace Joaquin Almunia as the EU Commissioner for Competition. Ms Vestager is to take office in November, subject to confirmation by the European Parliament.
The new Commissioner and her agenda will have a significant impact on business in the European Union in the upcoming years. The EU Commissioner for Competition is one of the most powerful figures in Europe because this role has the ability to review deals, impose fines for cartel behaviour or abuse of dominance (monopolisation) and order the recovery of illegal subsidies.
On 4 September 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed that the maximum fine of 10 per cent of turnover imposed on the infringing subsidiary of a non-infringing parent company should be calculated on the basis of the turnover of that subsidiary, and not the parent company, if and to the extent that the infringement occurred during the period prior to the acquisition of the subsidiary by the parent company.
In 2007, the European Commission issued a decision fining the participants in a cartel operating on the market for zips and other fasteners.
Stocko Fasteners participated in the cartel as an independent company from 1991 until 1997, when it was acquired by the YKK Group and renamed YKK Stocko Fasteners. It continued to participate in the cartel until 2001. YKK Stocko Fasteners was fined €19.25 million for its participation in the cartel from 1991 to 1997, calculated on the basis of the YKK Group’s turnover. The YKK Group companies (including YKK Stocko Fasteners) were fined €49 million jointly and severally for the period 1997 to 2001.
These fines were upheld by the EU General Court and the YKK Group appealed to the CJEU, inter alia, against the fine imposed on YKK Stocko Fasteners. The YKK Group argued that the limit on fines of 10 per cent of total turnover prescribed by Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 should have been applied only to YKK Stocko Fasteners’ turnover and not to the turnover of the whole YKK Group. The fine of €19.25 million imposed on YKK Stocko Fasteners amounted to significantly more than 10 per cent of that company’s total turnover in 2006, the business year preceding the imposition of the fine.
The CJEU’s Ruling
The CJEU observed that Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that “For each undertaking… participating in the infringement, the fine shall not exceed 10 per cent of its total turnover in the preceding business year” (authors’ emphasis). Stocko Fasteners was a separate undertaking until its acquisition by the YKK Group in 1997, so the CJEU found the Commission was wrong to treat YKK Stocko Fasteners and the rest of the YKK Group as a single undertaking for the purposes of the 10 per cent limit. In fact, if YKK Stocko Fasteners did not pay the €19.25 million fine, the Commission could not enforce payment by the rest of the YKK Group. The CJEU consequently decided to set aside the General Court’s judgment and annul the Commission’s decision, and reduced the fine imposed on YKK Stocko Fasteners to €2.79 million. This figure corresponded with 10 per cent of its turnover as a YKK subsidiary in 2006, the year preceding the imposition of the fine, less an allowance for leniency.
Comment
Over recent years, the way fines against cartels are calculated and attributed has become ever more hotly debated. In most cases, the central issue has been the attribution of the fine to parent companies for infringements by their subsidiaries, or to shareholding partners for [...]
The European Commission (Commission) took the first concrete action towards using EU State aid rules against aggressive tax planning by multinational companies by opening formal investigations against Ireland (Apple), Luxembourg (Fiat Finance and Trade) and the Netherlands (Starbucks). The Commission has concerns that these companies may have benefited from a selective advantage in the form of tax rulings by tax authorities that confer on them a preferential calculation of the taxable basis. The Commission has already announced that it investigates further cases of alleged State aid in the form of tax rulings in at least six EU Member States (including France and the UK) in the upcoming months.
In a landmark ruling, the EU’s top court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Kone and Others C-557/12 of 5 June 2014, has held that, where a cartel causes competing companies to increase their prices, the members of the cartel may be held liable for losses incurred by victims of those price increases.
In its decision of 2 April 2014 in relation to the underground and submarine high voltage power cables cartel case (COMP/39610), the European Commission (Commission) held the parent companies of the producers involved liable, on the basis that they had exercised decisive influence over the producers. The fines levied by the Commission in this case totalled €301.6 million. One of the businesses found liable was Goldman Sachs, the former owner of Prysmian, which is one of the companies that allegedly participated in the cartel.
This case has important implications for private equity funds. It confirms that, in principle, the Commission does not view private equity funds differently to other businesses for the purpose of the application of the parental liability doctrine.
On 21 March 2014, the European Commission (Commission) adopted a revised set of rules for the assessment of technology transfer agreements by the Commission and national competition authorities. The new Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation and accompanying Technology Transfer Guidelines will enter into force on 1 May 2014. The revised regime provides clearer and, arguably much needed, guidance on licensing agreements. This enhanced clarity should make it easier for businesses to assess whether or not their licensing and other collaborative practices aimed at the transfer of technology are in compliance with EU competition law.
The European Court of Justice decided on 21 November 2013 that EU national courts must assume that a measure qualifies as State aid, if the European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into that measure.
This judgment is relevant to all cases in which the disputed measure was already granted, or is planned to be granted, and the European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation but not yet made a final decision on whether or not the measures qualify as State aid.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided on 21 November 2013 in Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH (C-284/12) on the obligations placed on national courts in EU Member States that have been asked by a third party to order the recovery of State aid that was granted to a beneficiary without approval by the European Commission.
The ECJ stated that, even though the assessment carried out by the European Commission in its decision to open an in-depth investigation is preliminary in nature, the decision to open an investigation has legal effect and is therefore binding for national courts in that they must find that the measure qualifies as State aid. If the aid was granted without approval by the European Commission, the national court will have to order its recovery.
Background
EU Member States cannot implement measures that qualify as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) until those measures have been approved by the European Commission (“the standstill obligation”, established in Article 107(3)(3) TFEU). The European Commission has exclusive competence to approve State aid.
National courts may, however, find an infringement of the standstill obligation and order the recovery of State aid that was granted without European Commission approval. Although national courts may not authorise State aid, they are permitted to decide whether or not a measure qualifies as State aid.
State aid investigations by the European Commission begin with a first phase, in which the European Commission requests information from the relevant EU Member State and gives the State the opportunity to give its views on the qualification of the relevant measures as State aid and grounds for their authorisation.
In complex cases, the European Commission generally opens an in-depth investigation. When making its decision to initiate an in-depth investigation, the European Commission has to provide an initial assessment of the measure and explain why it has come to the preliminary conclusion that the measure qualifies as State aid.
In the case at hand, the competitor of an alleged aid beneficiary approached a German court seeking recovery of alleged aid given to the beneficiary and suspension of its implementation. According to the appellant, the measure qualified as State aid, was granted without approval by the European Commission and was therefore in violation of the standstill obligation. The European Commission opened an in-depth State aid investigation into the relevant measures in 2006, but the final decision is still outstanding.
On 8 October 2013, the European Commission issued updated guidance for companies making oral statements in leniency applications. The Commission requests that the oral statement is clear, factual and to the point and is only accepted during working hours.
On 11 June, the European Commission (“Commission”) published its long-awaited package of proposals on private antitrust litigation. The package is divided into three sets: (1) a Draft Directive on actions for damages (2) a Draft Recommendation on promoting group claims (3) and a Draft Communication and Draft Guidelines on estimating the amount of loss suffered by victims of cartels.
On 11 June, the European Commission (“Commission”) published its long-awaited package of proposals on private antitrust litigation. The package is divided into three sets: (1) a Draft Directive on actions for damages (2) a Draft Recommendation on promoting group claims (3) and a Draft Communication and Draft Guidelines on estimating the amount of loss suffered by victims of cartels.
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