McDermott’s Antitrust M&A Snapshot is a resource for in-house counsel and others who deal with antitrust M&A issues but are not faced with these issues on a daily basis. In each quarterly issue, we will provide concise summaries of Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ) and European Commission (EC) news and events related to M&A, including significant ongoing investigations, trials and consent orders, as well as analysis on the trends we see developing in the antitrust review process.
This month has seen significant changes in the landscape of federal leadership and the changes have now reached the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). On January 13, current Chair Edith Ramirez announced that she would resign from her position effective February 10, 2017. This Wednesday, January 25, the new administration designated Maureen Ohlhausen as Acting Chair. Ohlhausen, a Republican, was one of two remaining commissioners at the agency, along with Democrat Terrell McSweeny.
Ramirez served as a commissioner since 2010 and chair since early 2013 by designation of fellow Harvard Law Review member, President Obama. She spent her early career as a litigator with Quinn Emanuel and focused on antitrust, unfair competition and Lanham Act work. From the beginning of her tenure as chair, Ramirez developed a reputation as a hard-working and effective leader who was experienced, even-handed and not afraid to bring mergers to court. As a Latina and the daughter of Mexican immigrants, Ramirez was the first member of an ethnic minority to oversee the agency. During her tenure, she also secured a number of high-profile wins for the commission.
Ohlhausen has been a commissioner since 2012, though she started at the FTC’s General Counsel’s Office back in 1997. She has also worked as an advisor to former FTC Commissioner Orson Swindle and has been Deputy Director and then Director of the Office of Policy Planning. Ohlhausen stated at a Heritage Foundation antitrust conference this month that “all signs point to a new antitrust policy.” She discussed narrowing the scope of “Second Requests” in merger reviews by making them more targeted and therefore less burdensome. She also expressed a priority of greater protection for intellectual property rights, complaining that the agency has been too quick to accuse standard essential patent (SEP) holders of anticompetitive behavior when suing to defend their rights.
Meanwhile, the new administration’s position on merger activity hasn’t been clear. While in October 2016, Donald Trump described the AT&T-Time Warner deal as “a deal we will not approve in my administration because it’s too much concentration of power in the hands of too few,” and said that Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Universal “concentrates far too much power in one massive entity that is trying to tell the voters what to think and what to do,” he has subsequently chosen advisers on telecom and antitrust issues who appear to apply traditional antitrust analysis that is more merger-friendly than the prior administration.
Republican and Former Commissioner Joshua Wright leads the new administration’s transition of the FTC. The incoming administration will need to find three new commissioners for the five-member panel. At least one of the three must be a Democrat. The new appointments will be very important to follow for clients considering mergers in the near future.
On Friday, January 13, 2017, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released the new Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation. These guidelines were jointly developed by the agencies and serve to update the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations that have been in place since April 1995. The new guidelines include a revised discussion on conduct involving foreign commerce, a new chapter on international cooperation, and updated language, case law, and illustrative examples throughout.
On January 13, 2017, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) issued updated Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (the Guidelines). The revised Guidelines follow nearly half a year of consideration and public commentary. According to the FTC, the updates were “intended to modernize the IP Licensing Guidelines without changing the agencies’ enforcement approach with respect to intellectual property licensing or expanding the IP Licensing Guidelines to address other topics.” In that vein, the modest updates to the Guidelines affirm that the antitrust agencies still believe that IP issues do not require an altered analysis and that the licensing of intellectual property is generally procompetitive.”
Bilal Sayyed, a McDermott partner and former official at the Federal Trade Commission, has prepared a thoughtful series of recommendations for actions which the new administration’s FTC might take. His paper considers options which the new administration may take based on prior precedents.
Continuing an active first half of 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) have challenged several large mergers and acquisitions. In fact, trials for the two national health insurer deals are slated to begin Q4 of 2016 in Washington, DC, where the agencies have had success in obtaining preliminary injunctions this year. Adding to the regulators’ successes in Q3 was a victory for the FTC on appeal in the Penn State Hershey Medical Center/PinnacleHealth System transaction, in which the Third Circuit overturned the district court’s formulation of the geographic market. Indeed, with another appeal in a hospital merger outstanding in the Seventh Circuit, Health Care M&A is an active sector to monitor.
In addition to the agencies’ operations, the upcoming US presidential election has also propelled antitrust policy into a national discussion. For the first time in a few decades, antitrust has appeared on the Democratic Party’s platform, and Hillary Clinton has also issued a statement promising to strengthen antitrust enforcement if elected president.
EUROPEAN UNION:
The July to September period has seen 87 merger control notifications, the vast majority being candidate cases for simplified procedure. There were also eight clearance decisions, five of which were Phase I cases with remedies—in each case, structural remedies were preferred by the European Commission (EC).
Antitrust intervention seems to have been focused more on the telecoms and pharmaceutical sectors, with divestitures being offered in every telecom and pharma Phase I and Phase II clearance decision since July.
On October 20, 2016, the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued joint Antitrust Guidance to Human Resource (HR) Professionals (the Guidance) involved in hiring and compensation decisions. The agencies issued the guidance to educate HR professionals about how the antitrust laws apply in the employment context.
On October 6, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released its report on patent assertion entity (PAE) activity. The report is the result of research that began in September 2014 to address a gap in the agency’s understanding of PAEs, how they operate and how policies can be developed to reduce nuisance litigation. The study focused on PAE practices, including acquisition, litigation and licensing. The FTC recommends that policymakers address asymmetries in PAE litigation through various procedural and substantive reforms.
In pharmaceutical transactions involving generic products, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has typically focused on narrow antitrust theories of harm and applied a narrow product market analysis often limited to a treatment for a particular indication (and sometimes to a specific mechanism of action). In these transactions, the FTC has consistently required fixes for generic overlaps when the transaction (1) reduces the number of significant generic competitors in a particular product market to three or fewer or (2) involves the combination of a branded pharmaceutical product with a “first-to-file” generic for the same product for which there are no other generics yet on the market. Using this narrow methodology, pharmaceutical transactions involving generics that required a fix could move through the FTC review process very quickly and generally achieve clearance in approximately six months from filing.
In May, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) required Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC to divest its 23 percent interest in Unimark Remedies, Ltd. and its US marketing rights to a generic drug under manufacture by Unimark as a condition to allowing Hikma to complete its acquisition of Roxane Laboratories. The FTC was concerned that Hikma’s continued holding of a 23 percent interest in Unimark after consummation of its proposed acquisition of Roxane would create the incentive and ability for Hikma to eliminate future competition between Roxane and Hikma/Unimark in the sale of generic flecainide tablets (a drug used to treat abnormally fast heart rhythms) in the United States.
The FTC’s divestiture requirement was unusual but not unprecedented. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines identify three theories of competitive harm associated with an acquisition or holding of a small but significant minority interest in a competitor.
Minority ownership, and any associated rights, such as veto rights over the competing firm’s budget or strategic decisions, or representation on its board of directors, may allow the shareholder to forestall, delay or otherwise hamper the competing firm’s further development or marketing of competitive products
The holder of a minority interest in a competing firm has diminished incentives to compete aggressively with the competitor firm because the holder obtains an economic benefit from the success of the competing firm through its partial ownership of that competitor.
The holder of a minority interest in a competing firm may have access to non-public, competitively sensitive information of the competing firm, and thus may be better able to coordinate its business decisions—such as pricing, output, or research and development efforts—with those of the competing firm, thus diminishing competition.
These theories of potential antitrust harm from minority interest acquisitions are not unique to the United States; other competition agencies, including the European Union’s competition directorate, accept and apply these theories when considering the competitive impact of a firm’s actual or proposed partial ownership interest in a competitor. However, the United States applies a significantly lower threshold than the European Union (and other competition agencies) for the pre-acquisition notification of an entity’s acquisition of a minority, non-controlling interest in another firm.
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