In the last two years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) brought, and won, several litigated merger cases by establishing narrow markets comprised of a subset of customers for a product. This narrow market theory, known as price discrimination market definition, allowed the agencies to allege markets in which the merging parties faced few rivals and, therefore, estimate high post-merger market shares. By their nature, price discrimination markets can lead to a challenge of a high-value deal where only a small number of the merging parties’ customers are allegedly harmed. Given the increased usage by the agencies and now judicial acceptance of the theory, counsel for merging parties must consider the potential for price discrimination market definition in assessing the antitrust risks for transactions.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division have been actively challenging mergers and acquisitions (M&A) across a variety of industries where there is not a viable or acceptable remedy to mitigate the agencies’ competitive concerns. Parties to M&A transactions that the FTC or the DOJ believe are likely to harm competition may remedy those concerns by divesting certain businesses or assets. The parties may divest the business or assets that raise anticompetitive concerns and proceed with the remainder of the transaction. Divestitures in horizontal mergers (i.e., transactions between competitors) aim to maintain or replace the competition in the relevant market that might otherwise be lost as a result of the transaction.
Proposed divestitures are evaluated on the particular facts of the case and must be robust enough to present a viable competitor. Recent transactions demonstrate that the FTC and DOJ will reject divestiture proposals that the agency finds insufficient, putting the entire deal at risk for merging parties. Before proposing a remedy to the FTC or DOJ, parties should keep the following in mind: (1) in today’s enforcement environment, the agencies are more demanding in seeking effective remedies; (2) the agencies are more likely to require a buyer up front, particularly if the parties seek to divest assets that are less than an entire on-going, stand-alone business, or the to-be-divested assets are at risk of deterioration pending divestiture; and (3) a buyer must be competitively and financially viable.
McDermott’s Antitrust M&A Snapshotis a resource for in-house counsel and others who deal with antitrust M&A issues but are not faced with these issues on a daily basis. In each quarterly issue, we will provide concise summaries of Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Justice (DOJ) and European Commission (EC) news and events related to M&A, including significant ongoing investigations, trials and consent orders, as well as analysis on the trends we see developing in the antitrust review process.
United States: January – June Update
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) have been actively challenging mergers and acquisitions in the first half of 2016. In some instances, the parties abandoned their deal once the FTC or DOJ issued a complaint, in others, the parties entered into consent agreements with the agencies. In matters where a divestiture is an acceptable remedy, the FTC and DOJ have required robust divestitures with financially and competitively viable buyers. There is increasing pressure for broad divestitures and for upfront buyers in industries where the agencies do not have ample experience and where there may not be multiple competitive buyers willing to acquire the assets.
In merger challenges, the agencies have been successful in obtaining preliminary injunctions in Washington, DC, but have been less successful outside of their home court. The agencies have successfully argued price discrimination markets, where sales of products to a narrow group of customers were the market, and courts are accepting the agencies’ narrow market definition. We also see a trend in challenges due to innovation, where the merging parties are the market leaders in new developments and research and development in particular areas. Investigations continue to take many months, with many approaching or exceeding a year.
EU: January – June Update
In the EU, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of notified transactions to the European Commission (from 277 notifications in 2013 to 337 in 2015). Most of these transactions have been cleared by the EU regulator in Phase I without any commitments. However, there have still been a number of antitrust interventions requiring the merging parties to offer, often far-reaching, remedies. One industry has recently seen a particularly high ratio of antitrust intervention is the telecoms sector. For example, in the merger between the mobile operators Telenor and TeliaSonera, the parties abandoned the transaction due to European Commission opposition to the transaction. The European Commission publicly announced that the transaction would not have been cleared, and that the remedies offered by the companies were not convincing. A prohibition decision was also issued, despite the offered remedies, in the failed combination of Telefónica UK’s “O2” and Hutchison 3G UK’s “Three”. This transaction involved the longest merger control review by the European Commission to end up in a prohibition decision (243 calendar days, compared to the average of 157 calendar days to block a deal).
With regard to current trends in merger control remedies at the level of the European Commission, there continues to be [...]
On May 9, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) posted an article summarizing recent developments and areas of competitive sensitivity in the acquisition of partial equity interests. Most antitrust challenges to mergers or acquisitions involve situations in which an acquiror takes control of the target company. However, substantive antitrust issues also can arise from acquisitions of less than controlling interests. The FTC has previously sought substantial remedies in acquisitions of minority interests in a competitor. These remedies have included imposing firewalls, altering companies’ ownership interests to become passive investors, or seeking divestitures.
The FTC’s post, which can be found here, outlines three ways in which partial-interest acquisitions in a competitor could lessen competition. First, an entity could use its interest—through representatives on a competitor’s board, for example—to affect decisions of the target. Second, an acquiring company’s partial ownership in its competitor could reduce the acquiring company’s incentives to compete aggressively. This feature arises because, by virtue of holding an interest in its rival, a company can still achieve an economic gain even if it does not win a competition or make a sale if the company in which it holds an equity interest obtains that business. Third, an entity could gain access to non-public, competitively sensitive information of its competitor, increasing the risk of coordinated conduct.
None of these theories are new, and they are contained in the 2010 FTC / DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Nevertheless, the FTC’s posting provides a helpful reminder for companies contemplating transactions that they need to evaluate not only the obvious anticompetitive effects raised by acquisitions of control, but also the less obvious theories of competitive harm.
On March 23, 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules (SMARTER) Act by a vote of 235-171, despite strenuous objections from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) review proposed mergers and acquisitions. Currently, the FTC can challenge transactions under different processes and standards than the DOJ, and those procedures provide several advantages to the FTC. The SMARTER Act would neutralize those advantages for the FTC by: (1) eliminating the FTC’s ability to use its internal administrative proceedings to challenge unconsummated transactions; and (2) standardizing the criteria for the FTC and DOJ to obtain a preliminary injunction to block a merger in federal court.
The FTC has the authority to pursue administrative relief to challenge a transaction. Even if the FTC is denied a preliminary injunction in federal court, the agency may continue to seek to block or unwind a transaction in an administrative trial at the FTC’s own in-house court. That process creates two procedural advantages for the FTC. First, the FTC can continue to challenge a transaction even after a federal district court denies an injunction. Second, because the full trial will take place in the FTC’s court, some courts have said that the the standard the FTC uses to obtain a federal court injunction is lower than the standard the DOJ must meet. The courts will generally grant the FTC an injunction if the case “raise[s] questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair ground” for a full hearing “by the FTC in the first instance and ultimately by the Court of Appeals.” Under that standard, the FTC need not show a substantial likelihood of success at the trial on the merits or irreparable harm.
The DOJ can only challenge transactions in federal court proceedings. The DOJ can seek a preliminary injunction under Section 15 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 25) on the grounds that the transaction is likely to substantially lessen competition. The DOJ is subject to a traditional equitable injunction standard including criteria such as a showing of a substantial likelihood of success and the potential for irreparable harm.
Supporters of the SMARTER Act argue that reform is necessary to ensure consistent and fair application of the antitrust laws. SMARTER Act supporters also argue that courts apply a more lenient standard to the FTC for blocking a transaction than to the DOJ. However, those that oppose the SMARTER Act argue that in practice, courts impose the same standards on the FTC and DOJ during injunction hearings. Those against the SMARTER Act also argue that workload statistics compiled in the DOJ and FTC Annual Competition Reports actually demonstrate that mergers reviewed by the DOJ are more likely to be challenged or receive a Second Request than mergers reviewed by the FTC. FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez expressed concern that the SMARTER Act “risks undermining the effectiveness of the FTC.” Chairwoman Ramirez also [...]
The FTC has entered into a final settlement with Drug Testing Compliance Group LLC (DTC Group) by order issued January 21, 2016, resolving an administrative case that alleged DTC Group had invited a competitor to collude with respect to customer allocation in violation of §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Specifically, the FTC complaint alleged that the president of DTC Group, an Idaho-based compliance company servicing the trucking industry, approached an unnamed direct competitor to complain about the competitor’s acquisition of a DTC Group customer. This allegedly led to a meeting, wherein the DTC Group president proposed to the principals of the competitor that the two companies agree not to solicit or compete for each other’s customers, and that they abide by a “first call wins” approach to customers. Allegedly the DTC Group president explained that this arrangement would allow each company to sell its services without fearing that its rival would later undercut with a lower price offer. This alleged conduct ran afoul of the §5 prohibition on “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” even without any proof or allegation that the competitor accepted the invitation. Indeed, there exists legal precedent under which the FTC can pursue an action for such conduct even without a demonstration of market power on the part of the respondent.
The settlement agreement prohibits DTC Group from communicating with competitors about pricing or rates, though public posting of rates is permitted. DTC Group is further prohibited from soliciting, entering into, or maintaining an agreement with any competitor to divide markets, allocate customers or fix prices. DTC Group is additionally prohibited from urging any competitor to raise, fix or maintain prices, or to limit or reduce service. The settlement requires DTC Group to report to FTC as to its compliance for the next 20 years. Based on publicly available information, there has been no apparent action taken against the unnamed competitor with respect to these allegations.
Of note for corporate counsel, there was no allegation in the case that DTC Group and its competitor had actually entered an agreement – rather, the underlying allegation was simply that DTC Group had invited a competitor to enter a customer allocation agreement. While it is unclear from the publicly-released materials how the FTC was alerted to this alleged invitation, this is an important reminder to companies that invitations to competitors to collude can result in legal action even if no further communications occur on the subject. Such overtures further provide an approached competitor with the opportunity to gain a competitive advantage by reporting the approaching company to the FTC.
On January 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld Virginia’s Certificate of Need (CON) laws, ruling that the scheme does not illegally discriminate against out-of-state health care providers. See Colon Health Ctrs. v. Hazel, No. 14-2283 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2015).
In Virginia, and the 35 other states with CON laws, health care facilities are required to obtain government approval before establishing or expanding certain medical facilities and undertaking major medical expenditures. CON laws require applicants to show sufficient public need for the expenditure in question and thereby attempt to reduce healthcare costs by preventing excess capacity and unnecessary duplication of services and equipment.
The plaintiff-appellants in the case were two out-of-state outpatient providers that sought to open facilities to provide medical imaging services in Virginia. Their request for a CON for new CT scanners and MRI machines was denied. The plaintiff-appellants subsequently challenged the laws as putting an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant commerce clause. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the CON requirement neither discriminated against nor placed an undue burden on interstate commerce because both in-state and out-of-state providers were required to abide by the CON requirement.
Previously, in October 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ) issued a joint statement urging Virginia to consider changes to its CON laws. Both agencies argued that CON requirements create significant competitive concerns by suppressing supply and misallocating resources. Moreover, FTC and DOJ said the requirements have not been shown to lower costs or improve the quality of care for consumers. The agencies said that CON requirements can hinder “the efficient functioning of health care markets” by allowing an existing provider to file challenges to prevent or delay competition from a rival. Additionally, they may enable anticompetitive agreements among providers to pursue CON approval for separate services. The Fourth Circuit’s recent opinion may lessen the likelihood that the FTC or DOJ would separately challenge Virginia’s CON laws, but the agencies are likely to remain active in speaking out against CON requirements in Virginia and elsewhere.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez and Assistant Attorney General William Baer testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law on May 15, 2015. The oversight hearing provided an opportunity for the heads of the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies to survey their agencies’ priorities and recent achievements. The two agency heads also faced congressional questions on a variety of topics ranging from proposed reforms to the FTC’s merger review process to the alleged unfair targeting of foreign firms by Chinese antitrust authorities.
In her prepared testimony, Chairwoman Ramirez reviewed her agency’s recent activity, emphasizing especially recent U.S. Supreme Court and appellate court victories. She reiterated the agency’s strategic focus on core areas of concern, including health care, where the agency continues to review health care provider and pharmaceutical industry mergers carefully. Ramirez also stressed the agency’s continued attention to combating efforts to stifle generic drug competition. Other key focus areas include consumer products and services, technology and energy markets.
For the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General Baer’s prepared remarks focused on the division’s criminal cartel enforcement activity, including the expansive London Interbank Offered Rates and auto parts investigations. Baer also highlighted the Division’s civil enforcement activity, noting for example that three major mergers had recently been abandoned in the face of concerns raised by the division.
Chairwoman Ramirez faced questioning from the subcommittee about its merger review process. Asked about a recent rule change, Ramirez downplayed the significance of the change and stated that it was meant merely to clarify the agency’s position in situations where a court has refused to issue a preliminary injunction. She stated that the new rule was not a departure from past practice and that the Commission always assessed each case to determine whether to continue with an administrative hearing in the wake of the denial of an injunction.
Ramirez also faced questioning about the proposed SMARTER Act. The proposed legislation, which passed out of committee in the House last fall, would require the DOJ and FTC to satisfy the same standards to obtain preliminary injunctions against mergers. Currently, for the DOJ to obtain an injunction, it must show that the transaction would cause irreparable harm if allowed to go forward. The FTC faces a different test, and must only show that the injunction is in the public interest. Under the proposed legislation, both agencies would be held to the irreparable harm standard. In addition, the legislation would prevent the FTC from using its administrative court for mergers where an injunction has been denied. Chairwoman Ramirez contended that the proposed Act “undermines one of the central strengths of the Federal Trade Commission and one of the reasons the FTC was created in the first instance, which was to have an expert body of bipartisan commissioners rule on and develop antitrust doctrine.” She pointed also to the agency’s record of appellate success to stress her view that the [...]
Earlier this week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published an article that offers guidance on the “failing firm” or “flailing firm” defense often invoked in the hospital merger context. The article, written by Debbie Feinstein and Alexis Gilman of the Bureau of Competition, clarifies the circumstances under which this defense is and is not available.
At the outset, Feinstein and Gilman point out the basic requirements for establishing a failing firm defense, as set forth in § 11 of the Horizontal Merger guidelines:
the company is unable to meet its obligations as they come due;
the firm would not be able to reorganize successfully in bankruptcy; and
it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that would keep its assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.
The article goes on to emphasize an additional nuance required for the defense—that the acquiring company is the only available purchaser. This goes hand-in-hand with requirement three listed above. As an example, the authors describe a recent FTC investigation that involved “a hospital that was clearly failing.” The hospital’s bankrupt status did not calm the FTC’s concerns about the transaction, because the FTC learned that there was an interested alternate purchaser who did not pose the same competitive risks as the chosen acquirer.
Even if the acquisition price of a “failing” or “flailing” firm is below the Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting threshold, potential acquirers should assess the antitrust risk associated with the transaction and be sure to factor any costs associated with that risk into the sticker price. The failing or flailing firm should be prepared to demonstrate the efforts it made to find an acquirer. Non-reportable transactions are within the FTC’s reach and are often on the agency’s radar, particularly in the health care context.
On March 18, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ordered Par Petroleum Corporation to terminate its storage and throughput rights at a key gasoline terminal in Hawaii. This action will settle FTC charges seeking to prevent Par’s acquisition of Koko’oha Investments, Inc. Notably, the market structure created as a result of this remedy mirrors a market structure that was deemed anticompetitive in a 2005 FTC action. The two differing approaches to the same market highlight a key trend in the FTC’s merger enforcement: the focus on competitive effects of a transaction, as opposed to the resulting market structure.
The Market for Hawaii-Grade Gasoline Blendstock
The allegedly anticompetitive transaction affects the market for Hawaii-grade gasoline blendstock. Gasoline blendstock is produced by refining crude oil and is later combined with ethanol to make finished gasoline. The finished gasoline is sold to Hawaiian consumers.
Prior to the transaction, there were four competitors in the market for Hawaii-grade gasoline blendstock. Par and another oil company competed by operating refineries and producing the blendstock on the Hawaiian Islands. The other two competitors, Mid Pac Petroleum, LLC, and Aloha Petroleum, Ltd., competed by sharing access to the only commercial gasoline terminal on the Islands not owned by a refinery and capable of receiving full waterborne shipments of gasoline blendstock. This terminal, the Barbers Point Terminal, was owned by Aloha, but Mid Pac shared access through a long-term storage and throughput agreement.
The two oil refiners produced more gasoline than was consumed in Hawaii. As a result, importing gasoline blendstock was unnecessary. However, Mid Pac and Aloha were able to constrain the price of gasoline blendstock purchased from the Hawaiian refiners by maintaining their ability to import gasoline blendstock through the Barbers Point Terminal.
The Proposed Transaction and the FTC Challenge
On June 2, 2014, Par agreed to acquire Koko’oha for $107 million. As part of this transaction, Par would acquire Koko’oha’s 100 percent membership interest in Mid Pac and, therefore, Mid Pac’s rights to access the Barbers Point Terminal. The FTC filed a complaint alleging this transaction was likely to substantially lessen competition in the bulk supply of Hawaii-grade gasoline blendstock.
The basis of the FTC’s action was that “[t]he Acquisition would weaken the threat of imports as a constraint on local refiners’ [gasoline blendstock] prices.” By acquiring Mid Pac’s throughput and storage rights at Barbers Point Terminal, Par would have an incentive to use those rights strategically to weaken Aloha’s ability to constrain the price of gasoline blendstock. The specific competitive concern the FTC cited was that Par would store substantial amounts of gasoline in the Barbers Point Terminal for extended periods of time. By doing so, Par would tie up the capacity at the terminal and thereby reduce the size of import shipment that Aloha could receive at the terminal. “This would force Aloha to spread substantial fixed freight costs over a smaller number of barrels of gasoline, which would significantly increase its cost-per-barrel of importing.”
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