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Drug Testing Company Settles FTC Case Alleging Invitation to Collude

The FTC has entered into a final settlement with Drug Testing Compliance Group LLC (DTC Group) by order issued January 21, 2016, resolving an administrative case that alleged DTC Group had invited a competitor to collude with respect to customer allocation in violation of §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Specifically, the FTC complaint alleged that the president of DTC Group, an Idaho-based compliance company servicing the trucking industry, approached an unnamed direct competitor to complain about the competitor’s acquisition of a DTC Group customer.  This allegedly led to a meeting, wherein the DTC Group president proposed to the principals of the competitor that the two companies agree not to solicit or compete for each other’s customers, and that they abide by a “first call wins” approach to customers.  Allegedly the DTC Group president explained that this arrangement would allow each company to sell its services without fearing that its rival would later undercut with a lower price offer.  This alleged conduct ran afoul of the §5 prohibition on “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” even without any proof or allegation that the competitor accepted the invitation.  Indeed, there exists legal precedent under which the FTC can pursue an action for such conduct even without a demonstration of market power on the part of the respondent.

The settlement agreement prohibits DTC Group from communicating with competitors about pricing or rates, though public posting of rates is permitted.  DTC Group is further prohibited from soliciting, entering into, or maintaining an agreement with any competitor to divide markets, allocate customers or fix prices.  DTC Group is additionally prohibited from urging any competitor to raise, fix or maintain prices, or to limit or reduce service.  The settlement requires DTC Group to report to FTC as to its compliance for the next 20 years.  Based on publicly available information, there has been no apparent action taken against the unnamed competitor with respect to these allegations.

Of note for corporate counsel, there was no allegation in the case that DTC Group and its competitor had actually entered an agreement – rather, the underlying allegation was simply that DTC Group had invited a competitor to enter a customer allocation agreement.  While it is unclear from the publicly-released materials how the FTC was alerted to this alleged invitation, this is an important reminder to companies that invitations to competitors to collude can result in legal action even if no further communications occur on the subject.  Such overtures further provide an approached competitor with the opportunity to gain a competitive advantage by reporting the approaching company to the FTC.




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Virginia’s Certificate of Need Laws May Stay, Fourth Circuit Says

On January 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld Virginia’s Certificate of Need (CON) laws, ruling that the scheme does not illegally discriminate against out-of-state health care providers. See Colon Health Ctrs. v. Hazel, No. 14-2283 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2015).

In Virginia, and the 35 other states with CON laws, health care facilities are required to obtain government approval before establishing or expanding certain medical facilities and undertaking major medical expenditures. CON laws require applicants to show sufficient public need for the expenditure in question and thereby attempt to reduce healthcare costs by preventing excess capacity and unnecessary duplication of services and equipment.

The plaintiff-appellants in the case were two out-of-state outpatient providers that sought to open facilities to provide medical imaging services in Virginia. Their request for a CON for new CT scanners and MRI machines was denied. The plaintiff-appellants subsequently challenged the laws as putting an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant commerce clause. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the CON requirement neither discriminated against nor placed an undue burden on interstate commerce because both in-state and out-of-state providers were required to abide by the CON requirement.

Previously, in October 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ) issued a joint statement urging Virginia to consider changes to its CON laws. Both agencies argued that CON requirements create significant competitive concerns by suppressing supply and misallocating resources. Moreover, FTC and DOJ said the requirements have not been shown to lower costs or improve the quality of care for consumers. The agencies said that CON requirements can hinder “the efficient functioning of health care markets” by allowing an existing provider to file challenges to prevent or delay competition from a rival. Additionally, they may enable anticompetitive agreements among providers to pursue CON approval for separate services. The Fourth Circuit’s recent opinion may lessen the likelihood that the FTC or DOJ would separately challenge Virginia’s CON laws, but the agencies are likely to remain active in speaking out against CON requirements in Virginia and elsewhere.




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Top Antitrust Enforcers Respond to Congressional Questioning

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez and Assistant Attorney General William Baer testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law on May 15, 2015. The oversight hearing provided an opportunity for the heads of the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies to survey their agencies’ priorities and recent achievements. The two agency heads also faced congressional questions on a variety of topics ranging from proposed reforms to the FTC’s merger review process to the alleged unfair targeting of foreign firms by Chinese antitrust authorities.

In her prepared testimony, Chairwoman Ramirez reviewed her agency’s recent activity, emphasizing especially recent U.S. Supreme Court and appellate court victories. She reiterated the agency’s strategic focus on core areas of concern, including health care, where the agency continues to review health care provider and pharmaceutical industry mergers carefully. Ramirez also stressed the agency’s continued attention to combating efforts to stifle generic drug competition. Other key focus areas include consumer products and services, technology and energy markets.

For the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General Baer’s prepared remarks focused on the division’s criminal cartel enforcement activity, including the expansive London Interbank Offered Rates  and auto parts investigations. Baer also highlighted the Division’s civil enforcement activity, noting for example that three major mergers had recently been abandoned in the face of concerns raised by the division.

Chairwoman Ramirez faced questioning from the subcommittee about its merger review process. Asked about a recent rule change, Ramirez downplayed the significance of the change and stated that it was meant merely to clarify the agency’s position in situations where a court has refused to issue a preliminary injunction. She stated that the new rule was not a departure from past practice and that the Commission always assessed each case to determine whether to continue with an administrative hearing in the wake of the denial of an injunction.

Ramirez also faced questioning about the proposed SMARTER Act. The proposed legislation, which passed out of committee in the House last fall, would require the DOJ and FTC to satisfy the same standards to obtain preliminary injunctions against mergers. Currently, for the DOJ to obtain an injunction, it must show that the transaction would cause irreparable harm if allowed to go forward. The FTC faces a different test, and must only show that the injunction is in the public interest. Under the proposed legislation, both agencies would be held to the irreparable harm standard. In addition, the legislation would prevent the FTC from using its administrative court for mergers where an injunction has been denied.  Chairwoman Ramirez contended that the proposed Act “undermines one of the central strengths of the Federal Trade Commission and one of the reasons the FTC was created in the first instance, which was to have an expert body of bipartisan commissioners rule on and develop antitrust doctrine.” She pointed also to the agency’s record of appellate success to stress her view that the [...]

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FTC Clarifies “Failing Firm” Defense

Earlier this week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published an article that offers guidance on the “failing firm” or “flailing firm” defense often invoked in the hospital merger context.  The article, written by Debbie Feinstein and Alexis Gilman of the Bureau of Competition, clarifies the circumstances under which this defense is and is not available.

At the outset, Feinstein and Gilman point out the basic requirements for establishing a failing firm defense, as set forth in § 11 of the Horizontal Merger guidelines:

  1. the company is unable to meet its obligations as they come due;
  2. the firm would not be able to reorganize successfully in bankruptcy; and
  3. it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that would keep its assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.

The article goes on to emphasize an additional nuance required for the defense—that the acquiring company is the only available purchaser.  This goes hand-in-hand with requirement three listed above.  As an example, the authors describe a recent FTC investigation that involved “a hospital that was clearly failing.”  The hospital’s bankrupt status did not calm the FTC’s concerns about the transaction, because the FTC learned that there was an interested alternate purchaser who did not pose the same competitive risks as the chosen acquirer.

Even if the acquisition price of a “failing” or “flailing” firm is below the Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting threshold, potential acquirers should assess the antitrust risk associated with the transaction and be sure to factor any costs associated with that risk into the sticker price.  The failing or flailing firm should be prepared to demonstrate the efforts it made to find an acquirer.  Non-reportable transactions are within the FTC’s reach and are often on the agency’s radar, particularly in the health care context.

The full text of the article is available here.




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FTC Consent Agreement with Par Petroleum Demonstrates Increased Agency Focus on Competitive Effects

On March 18, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ordered Par Petroleum Corporation to terminate its storage and throughput rights at a key gasoline terminal in Hawaii. This action will settle FTC charges seeking to prevent Par’s acquisition of Koko’oha Investments, Inc. Notably, the market structure created as a result of this remedy mirrors a market structure that was deemed anticompetitive in a 2005 FTC action. The two differing approaches to the same market highlight a key trend in the FTC’s merger enforcement: the focus on competitive effects of a transaction, as opposed to the resulting market structure.

The Market for Hawaii-Grade Gasoline Blendstock

The allegedly anticompetitive transaction affects the market for Hawaii-grade gasoline blendstock. Gasoline blendstock is produced by refining crude oil and is later combined with ethanol to make finished gasoline. The finished gasoline is sold to Hawaiian consumers.

Prior to the transaction, there were four competitors in the market for Hawaii-grade gasoline blendstock. Par and another oil company competed by operating refineries and producing the blendstock on the Hawaiian Islands. The other two competitors, Mid Pac Petroleum, LLC, and Aloha Petroleum, Ltd., competed by sharing access to the only commercial gasoline terminal on the Islands not owned by a refinery and capable of receiving full waterborne shipments of gasoline blendstock. This terminal, the Barbers Point Terminal, was owned by Aloha, but Mid Pac shared access through a long-term storage and throughput agreement.

The two oil refiners produced more gasoline than was consumed in Hawaii. As a result, importing gasoline blendstock was unnecessary. However, Mid Pac and Aloha were able to constrain the price of gasoline blendstock purchased from the Hawaiian refiners by maintaining their ability to import gasoline blendstock through the Barbers Point Terminal.

The Proposed Transaction and the FTC Challenge

On June 2, 2014, Par agreed to acquire Koko’oha for $107 million. As part of this transaction, Par would acquire Koko’oha’s 100 percent membership interest in Mid Pac and, therefore, Mid Pac’s rights to access the Barbers Point Terminal. The FTC filed a complaint alleging this transaction was likely to substantially lessen competition in the bulk supply of Hawaii-grade gasoline blendstock.

The basis of the FTC’s action was that “[t]he Acquisition would weaken the threat of imports as a constraint on local refiners’ [gasoline blendstock] prices.” By acquiring Mid Pac’s throughput and storage rights at Barbers Point Terminal, Par would have an incentive to use those rights strategically to weaken Aloha’s ability to constrain the price of gasoline blendstock. The specific competitive concern the FTC cited was that Par would store substantial amounts of gasoline in the Barbers Point Terminal for extended periods of time. By doing so, Par would tie up the capacity at the terminal and thereby reduce the size of import shipment that Aloha could receive at the terminal. “This would force Aloha to spread substantial fixed freight costs over a smaller number of barrels of gasoline, which would significantly increase its cost-per-barrel of importing.”

On March 18, 2015, the FTC and Par [...]

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FTC Rule Change Simplifies Process Following a Denial of a Preliminary Injunction Motion

On March 14, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced procedural revisions governing the FTC process when it loses an injunction bid in federal court, to block the consummation of a merger pending its in-house administrative proceedings on the legality of the merger.

When the FTC seeks to challenge a merger, the FTC generally seeks an injunction in court to prevent consummation of the merger pending the outcome of an internal administrative proceeding.  If the injunction is implemented, it prevents the parties from integrating the assets and preserves the FTC’s ability to effectively and efficiently fix the merger should it be warranted at the conclusion of the administrative proceeding.

Under the new rules, when the FTC loses its request for an injunction, the pending in-house administrative proceeding will be automatically withdrawn or stayed at the request of the merging parties unless the FTC determines that continuing the litigation would serve the public interest.  The intention of the new procedure it to make clear that the FTC will not automatically continue its internal administrative hearing to block a merger if it fails to win an injunction in federal court.

When deciding whether to continue its administrative proceedings, the FTC will still evaluate a proposed transaction under the same factors it used before the rule change.  The five factors the FTC uses to determine whether it is in the public interest to pursue administrative proceedings are: (1) a federal court’s factual findings and legal conclusions; (2) any new evidence developed during the preliminary injunction proceeding; (3) whether administrative proceedings will resolve important issues of fact, law or merger policy raised by the transaction; (4) an overall evaluation of the costs and benefits; and (5) any other matter that influences whether it would be in the public interest to continue with the merger challenge.

The FTC’s procedural revision will go into force shortly.  It will, therefore, be in effect before the outcome of its preliminary injunction hearing seeking to block the merger between Sysco Corp. and US Foods Inc. pending an internal administrative proceeding.  The preliminary injunction hearing is set in May 2015 before Judge Amit Mehta in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the in-house administrative proceeding is set for July.  If the FTC loses the preliminary injunction hearing in federal court, the new procedure will be exercised for the first time.




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FTC Competition Chief Defends Stand-Alone Section 5 Use in Unfair Competition Cases

In a blog post last Friday, Debbie Feinstein, Director of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), defended the agency’s use of FTC Act Section 5 to target unfair methods of competition outside the scope of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.

While the use of Section 5 in consumer protection cases has long been established, many, including U.S. Congress members and FTC Commissioners, have urged the FTC in recent years to issue clearer guidelines on how Section 5 will be used to target conduct related to unfair methods of competition.  Feinstein suggested that those interested in the FTC’s future use of Section 5 “should look at what the Commission has done and the reason it gave for acting to stop the behavior. . . . The touchstone of every stand-alone Section 5 claim . . . is likely or actual harm to competition or the competitive process.”

Feinstein pointed specifically to invitation to collude cases as a prime example of the type of conduct prosecuted in a stand-alone Section 5 action.  The FTC first brought an invitation to collude case in the early 1990s, see Quality Trailer Products, 115 F.T.C. 922 (1992), in which Quality Trailer Products employees visited a competitor and urged it to raise its prices while stating that Quality Trailer would also raise prices.  Since that time, the FTC has continued to use Section 5 to bring actions in invitation to collude cases.  Most recently, the FTC brought complaints against two internet resellers of UPC barcodes in July 2014, alleging they had sent messages to one of their competitors proposing a scheme to raise their prices in line with the prices of another competitor.  Feinstein suggested that the large number of cases brought unanimously by the Commissioners “demonstrates that we are using our stand-alone Section 5 authority responsibly.”

Feinstein also noted that nearly all stand-alone Section 5 cases brought by the FTC have resulted in an injunctive remedy —  “I want to underscore that the Commission’s policy is not to seek disgorgement in stand-alone Section 5 cases. . . . Without the threat of a monetary penalty (let alone treble damages), I find it hard to understand the claim that significant procompetitive conduct is chilled by the possibility that the FTC may use its stand-alone Section 5 authority in some unforeseen way.”




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FTC Merger Review Likely to Incorporate Analysis of Privacy Issues

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC or the Commission), along with the U.S. Department of Justice, can challenge mergers it believes will result in a substantial lessening of competition – for example through higher prices, lower quality or reduced rates of innovation.  Although the analysis of whether a transaction may be anticompetitive typically focuses on price, privacy is increasingly regarded as a kind of non-price competition, like quality or innovation.  During a recent symposium on the parameters and enforcement reach of Section 5 of the FTC Act, Deborah Feinstein, the director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, noted that privacy concerns are becoming more important in the agency’s merger reviews.  Specifically she stated, “Privacy could be a form of non-price competition important to customers that could be actionable if two kinds of companies competed on privacy commitments on technologies they came up with.”

At this same symposium, Jessica Rich, director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, remarked on the agency’s increasing expectations that companies protect the consumer data they collect and be more transparent about what they collect, how they store and protect it, and about third parties with whom they share the data.

The FTC’s Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection fulfill the agency’s dual mission to promote competition and protect consumers, in part, through the enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act.  With two areas of expertise and a supporting Bureau of Economics under one roof, the Commission is uniquely positioned to analyze whether a potential merger may substantially lessen privacy-related competition.

The concept that privacy is a form of non-price competition is not new to the FTC.  In its 2007 statement upon closing its investigation into the merger of Google, Inc. and DoubleClick Inc., the Commission recognized that mergers can “adversely affect non-price attributes of competition, such as consumer privacy.”  Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour’s dissent in the Google/DoubleClick matter outlined a number of forward-looking competition and privacy-related considerations for analyzing mergers of data-rich companies.  The FTC ultimately concluded that the evidence in that case “did not support the theories of potential competitive harm” and thus declined to challenge the deal.  The matter laid the groundwork, however, for the agency’s future consideration of these issues.

While the FTC has yet to challenge a transaction on the basis that privacy competition would be substantially lessened, parties can expect staff from both the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection to be working closely together to analyze a proposed transaction’s impact on privacy.  The FTC’s review of mergers between entities with large databases of consumer information may focus on: (1) whether the transaction will result in decreased privacy protections,i.e., lower quality of privacy; and (2) whether the combined parties achieve market power as a result of combining their consumer data.

This concept is not unique to the United States.  The European Commission’s 2008 decision inTomTom/Tele Atlas examined whether there would be a decrease in privacy-based competition [...]

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FTC Commissioner Brill Comments on Potential Reforms in Data Privacy Enforcement

On February 18, 2015, Commissioner Julie Brill spoke to students at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth concerning the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) recent data privacy and security enforcement, as well as the FTC’s interactions with international regulators in this area.  In her prepared remarks, Commissioner Brill described ways she hopes the FTC and other regulators can improve their current data privacy enforcement regimes to “develop practical, effective, and interoperable frameworks that will allow data to be adequately protected.”

Commissioner Brill addressed the skepticism of those who believe the United States is the “Wild West” of data privacy, by highlighting the FTC’s enforcement of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  However, she made clear that the U.S. “consumer privacy and data security framework can and should be improved.”  She specifically endorsed President Obama’s proposed legislation as described during a recent visit to the FTC.  These legislative proposals include strengthening the FTC’s existing data security enforcement tools by authorizing the FTC to obtain civil penalties from companies that break the law.  Further, the White House and the FTC seek legislation that would provide consumers with greater transparency concerning how their data is collected and used by data brokers.

In addition to her comments concerning methods to improve the U.S. data security regime, Commissioner Brill described ongoing discussions with foreign data security regulators, especially those in Europe, concerning the global flow of personal data.  Like their counterparts in the U.S., European regulators are in the process of drafting a new regulation to heighten data security protections and address the dynamic new ways companies are using personal data.  As they modify their own data security frameworks, the FTC and foreign regulators are engaged in a dialogue concerning the interoperability of their data privacy laws.  Both groups recognize the importance of the flow of data to their respective economies, but each seeks to protect the interests of consumers and companies under their own laws.  Commissioner Brill is “optimistic” that agreements will be reached to promote the interoperability of the data privacy regimes.

As more companies create products that will collect and transmit personal data, there will likely be significant changes to the data privacy regimes attempting to protect consumers from harm.  To avoid potential regulatory action, any company that collects, uses or shares consumers’ personal data should ensure that there are protections in place to secure personal data from breaches or hacks.  In addition, companies should promote transparency by providing clear statements about their data collection and use to consumers.




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Out-of-Market Divestiture Required to Resolve Competitive Concerns

On January 30, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a settlement of its investigation into Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.’s (Sun) acquisition of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (Ranbaxy) from Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd.  Sun and Ranbaxy are both multinational pharmaceutical companies that produce a range of generic and branded drugs.

In its complaint, the FTC alleges the relevant product market to be “the development, license, manufacture, marketing, distribution, and sale of generic minocycline hydrochloride 50 mg, 75 mg, and 100 mg tablets (‘minocycline tablets’).”  Ranbaxy is currently one of only three U.S. suppliers of the relevant doses of minocycline tablets, with Sun being one of a limited number of firms likely to enter the alleged market in the near future.  The complaint further alleges that the acquisition would eliminate a potential future competitor and therefore tend to substantially lessen competition by foregoing or delaying Sun’s entry into the relevant market and increase the likelihood that the combined entity would reduce price competition.

To resolve the competitive concern, the FTC is requiring divestiture not only of the minocycline tablets but also a product outside of the alleged relevant market—minocycline capsules.  In its aid to public comment, the FTC states that this out-of-market divestiture is necessary to ensure that the divestiture buyer “achieves regulatory approval to qualify a new [active pharmaceutical ingredient] supplier for its minocycline tablets as quickly as Ranbaxy would have.”

Once the FTC or U.S. Department of Justice  determines that a competitive problem exists, the agency will seek potential remedies, including divestiture.   A cornerstone principle the agencies apply in evaluating a proposed remedy is that the remedy must restore competition to the level that would have existed had the underlying merger or acquisition not proceeded.   This case illustrates an application of that principle, where the FTC required the divestiture of the out-of-market assets because, in its view, if those assets were not included the remedy would have left the relevant product market less competitive than it would have been if Sun and Ranbaxy remained independent competitors.

Although not a common outcome, firms considering a transaction involving products subject to regulatory approval should take note of the potential for out-of-market divestitures when assessing a potential deal.

The FTC’s complaint and related documents can be found here.




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