horizontal merger guidelines Archives

horizontal merger guidelines

Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q2 2024

by Glenna Siegel, Mary Hecht, Jon B. Dubrow, Joel R. Grosberg, Stéphane Dionnet, Graham Hyman and Max Küttner | Jul 25, 2024 | Cartel Enforcement, DOJ Developments, EC Developments, EU Developments, FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, Mergers & Acquisitions

Topics covered in this edition:

UNITED STATES

US agencies are increasingly scrutinizing consummated mergers from years past, including Live Nation’s purchase of Ticketmaster and Meta’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.
Reports indicate that, over the past three years, companies have abandoned 37 deals in the face of Federal Trade Commission pressure.
Merger activity in oil and gas markets remains high, and although agencies are scrutinizing these deals, they engaged in minimal enforcement activity this quarter.

EUROPEAN UNION

Court of Justice of the European Union Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou issued his opinion in the Illumina/Grail case, concluding that Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation is not the European solution for dealing with “killer acquisitions.”
The European Commission (EC) issued a competition policy brief on non-price competition in EU merger control, noting that it is increasingly evaluating non-price competition parameters alongside traditional price effects for its merger reviews.
The EC suspects Kingspan to have intentionally, or negligently, provided incorrect, incomplete and misleading information while it investigated the company’s planned acquisition of Trimo in 2021.

UNITED KINGDOM

The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act will grant the Competition & Markets Authority with powers to enforce the new digital markets competition regime and will apply to firms that are designated as having strategic market status.

Access the full issue.

Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q1 2023

by Anthony S. Ferrara, Max Küttner, Jon B. Dubrow, Joel R. Grosberg, Stéphane Dionnet and Matt Evola | Apr 20, 2023 | DOJ Developments, EC Developments, EU Developments, FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, Mergers & Acquisitions

Topics covered in this edition:

Christine Wilson Resigns as FTC Commissioner
FTC/Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines Delayed
Agencies Maintain Focus on Private Equity, Especially in Healthcare
Continuing a Trend: FTC Loses Challenge to Meta’s Acquisition of Within
Agencies Continue to Challenge Transactions Outright Rather than Negotiate Settlements
New Regulatory Burden: The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation Enters into Force
A New Route for Complainants: ECJ Towercast Ruling Confirms Non-Notifiable Acquisition Can Be Abuse of Dominant Position
CMA’s New Leadership Team Focuses on Digitalisation and Supply Chain Issues Impacting Consumers

Access the full issue.

Antitrust M&A Snapshot | Q1 2022

by Anthony S. Ferrara, Hannelore Wiame, Jon B. Dubrow, Joel R. Grosberg and Lisa P. Rumin | May 6, 2022 | DOJ Developments, EC Developments, EU Developments, French Developments, FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, Mergers & Acquisitions

In the United States, antitrust agencies continue with their aggressive merger enforcement posture. The agencies challenged four transactions this quarter, including multiple vertical mergers. The agencies are increasingly skeptical of merger remedies, including behavioral remedies and divestitures. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are working together to update the current Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The updated guidelines will likely signal a more aggressive enforcement posture.

The European Commission (Commission) blocked one transaction in Phase II and cleared two transactions. Three transactions were abandoned after the Commission initiated a Phase II investigation. The Commission made use of partial referrals to member state national competition authorities in two cases. It also ordered Hungary to withdraw its decision to prohibit Vienna Insurance Group’s (VIG) acquisition of AEGON Group’s Hungarian subsidiaries on foreign direct investment grounds, holding that Hungary’s prohibition decision infringed Article 21 of the EU Merger Regulation.

In the United Kingdom, the first quarter of 2022 also saw a number of Phase II investigations. Specifically, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) cleared one transaction in Phase II and blocked two other transactions in Phase II. One transaction was abandoned after the CMA initiated a Phase II investigation. The CMA blocked the merger of Cargotec and Konecranes just one month after the EC cleared the transaction subject to commitments in Phase II. The parties abandoned the transaction following the CMA’s decision.

Access the full issue.

Heard on Day One of 2022 Antitrust Law Spring Meeting

by Lisa P. Rumin, Anthony S. Ferrara, Reese Poncia, Alexandra Lewis, Graham Hyman, Joshua W. Eastby and Han Cui | Apr 7, 2022 | Cartel Enforcement, DOJ Developments, FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, Joint Ventures/Competitor Collaboration, Mergers & Acquisitions, Monopolization/Abuse of Dominance

This week, the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Law Section kicked off its annual Spring Meeting in Washington, DC, which features updates from the antitrust enforcers and substantive discussions on today’s most pressing antitrust issues. In this post, we share key takeaways from the first day of the Spring Meeting.

Agencies Continue to Be Hostile to M&A: Republican Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioners Noah Phillips and Christine Wilson emphasized that the prevailing view under Democratic leadership at the antitrust agencies is that mergers provide no value and only carry costs.

Progressive leadership wants to “throw sand in the gears” to prevent deals from being proposed altogether. Recent policy changes are aimed at creating uncertainty, heightening risk and raising the transaction costs of doing deals to slow the pace of M&A activity.
Despite this, there was a precipitous drop in the number of FTC merger enforcement actions in the final year of the Trump administration (31) compared to the first year of the Biden administration (12).
There is no indication that early termination for Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) pre-merger notification filings will be reinstated.
“Close At Your Peril” letters are another tactic the agencies are using to heighten deal risk and deter parties from pursuing or consummating transactions, even though the antitrust agencies have always had the authority to investigate and challenge consummated transactions.
Many panelists commented on the lack of transparency between agency staff and merging parties on recent transactions. If the lack of transparency persists, it may create due process issues and problems for timing agreements that merging parties typically negotiate with staff.
The antitrust agencies are increasingly skeptical of the efficacy of structural and behavioral remedies to resolve competition concerns regarding a transaction. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division’s Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki said merging parties should expect the DOJ to reject “risky settlements” more often and instead seek to block transactions outright. Mekki said literature has shown that many merger settlements failed to protect competition.

Increased Antitrust Litigation Is on the Horizon: DOJ officials said companies should expect an increase in antitrust litigation on both civil and criminal matters.

The DOJ Antitrust Division has more cases in active litigation than it has had at any time in recent history. It currently has six active litigations involving civil matters and 21 ongoing litigations involving criminal matters.
The Antitrust Division is not considering cost as a gating factor for bringing new cases. Instead, it is bringing cases where it deems necessary to uphold the law and preserve competition. The DOJ is hiring more attorneys and using shared DOJ resources to support the increased rate of litigation.
The DOJ is also seeking faster access to the courts. Mekki indicated that in cases where potential anticompetitive harm resulting from a transaction is clear, the agency may file suit while an investigation remains pending and before merging parties have certified substantial compliance.

Updated Merger Guidelines Are Coming: Officials from both the FTC and [...]

Continue Reading

United Technologies/Raytheon Highlights Key Issues in Aerospace and Defense Industry Merger Review

by Anthony S. Ferrara and Jon B. Dubrow | Apr 23, 2020 | DOJ Developments, FTC Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions, Monopolization/Abuse of Dominance

The DOJ Antitrust Division’s recent challenge to the United Technologies/Raytheon merger highlights a few key considerations for antitrust reviews of aerospace and defense industry transactions. The case is a useful illustration of important principles applicable to this unique industry.

Access Full Article

Aerospace and Defense Series: DOJ and FTC Vertical Merger Guidelines Will Impact Government Contractors

by Anthony S. Ferrara and Jon B. Dubrow | Feb 24, 2020 | DOJ Developments, FTC Developments, Joint Ventures/Competitor Collaboration, Mergers & Acquisitions

Last month, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released updated Vertical Merger Guidelines in draft form. These guidelines provide a useful resource for aerospace and defense contractors involved in M&A transactions. Vertical competition issues frequently arise in this industry given the nature of the supply base and contracting and supply relationships between companies operating at different levels of the supply chain.

This is the first time the antitrust agencies have released updated guidelines for analyzing vertical mergers since 1984. Although the agencies have updated the Horizontal Merger Guidelines several times since then (most recently in 2010), they have not provided similar updated guidance to businesses regarding vertical merger enforcement until now. The new guidelines summarize the practices, standards, and theories the agencies have used in evaluating vertical mergers for a number of years. Although the guidelines do not signal any shifts in current agency practice, they do provide the business community greater transparency about how the agencies analyze vertical mergers. This is helpful for the aerospace and defense industry, which is particularly susceptible to vertical competition issues given the heavy reliance on contracting out important elements at different levels of the supply chain.

(more…)

THE LATEST: Federal Judge Blocks Merger of Nuclear Waste Disposal Companies Rejecting “Failing Firm” Defense

by Mary Strimel | Jul 18, 2017 | DOJ Developments, Mergers & Acquisitions

On June 21, 2017, US District Judge Sue L. Robinson blocked EnergySolutions, Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS), applying a strict standard for the “failing firm” defense to a merger challenge. The parties compete in the disposal of low level radioactive waste (LLRW). WCS had argued that it would be forced to exit the market due to heavy operating losses if the transaction were not approved. Judge Robinson’s recently released opinion provides insights into how aggressively a putative failing firm must shop its assets to third parties before it can qualify for the failing firm defense to an otherwise anticompetitive merger.

WHAT HAPPENED:

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit in November 2016 to enjoin the proposed acquisition of WCS by EnergySolutions, arguing that the merger would lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the LLRW disposal industry. DOJ alleged that EnergySolutions and WCS are the only significant competitors in this industry for the relevant geographic market.

The court found that the government easily established a prima facie case of anticompetitive effects by demonstrating that the proposed acquisition would create a firm controlling an exceedingly high percentage of the relevant market and result in a significant increase in market concentration. Judge Robinson identified two product markets: the disposal of higher-activity LLRW, and the disposal of lower-activity LLRW. In both markets she found that the relevant measures of concentration “blow past the presumptive barriers” for harm to competition, especially in regards to higher-activity LLRW where the transaction would result in a “merger to monopoly.”

The defendants’ main defense to rebut the government’s prima facie case was that WCS was a “failing firm.” The failing-firm doctrine considers the possible harm to competition resulting from an acquisition preferable to the negative impact on competition, loss to stockholders, and negative effect on local communities that results when a company goes out of business. Judge Robinson’s opinion explains that in order to assert a valid failing firm defense, the defendants must show that WCS faces the “grave possibility of business failure” and that there was no “other prospective purchaser.”

Judge Robinson avoided deciding the more difficult question concerning whether WCS indeed faced imminent business failure, finding instead that the defendants failed to demonstrate that EnergySolutions was the only available purchaser. According to Judge Robinson, WCS’s parent company failed to make the necessary “good faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers” that would have lesser negative effects on competition.

The opinion highlights the fact that once it was clear that the parent company was serious about selling all of WCS, the parent company had already agreed to several deal protection devices, such as a 30-day exclusivity period with EnergySolutions, and a “no-talk” provision in the merger agreement. WCS and its parent company thus did not respond to other companies that reached out to express interest in acquiring WCS after the transaction with EnergySolutions was [...]

Continue Reading

US and EU Requirements for Pre-Merger Notification of an Acquisition of a Minority Shareholding Interest

by Bilal Sayyed and McDermott Will & Emery | Aug 31, 2016 | DOJ Developments, EC Developments, EU Developments, Joint Ventures/Competitor Collaboration, Mergers & Acquisitions

In May, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) required Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC to divest its 23 percent interest in Unimark Remedies, Ltd. and its US marketing rights to a generic drug under manufacture by Unimark as a condition to allowing Hikma to complete its acquisition of Roxane Laboratories. The FTC was concerned that Hikma’s continued holding of a 23 percent interest in Unimark after consummation of its proposed acquisition of Roxane would create the incentive and ability for Hikma to eliminate future competition between Roxane and Hikma/Unimark in the sale of generic flecainide tablets (a drug used to treat abnormally fast heart rhythms) in the United States.

The FTC’s divestiture requirement was unusual but not unprecedented. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines identify three theories of competitive harm associated with an acquisition or holding of a small but significant minority interest in a competitor.

Minority ownership, and any associated rights, such as veto rights over the competing firm’s budget or strategic decisions, or representation on its board of directors, may allow the shareholder to forestall, delay or otherwise hamper the competing firm’s further development or marketing of competitive products
The holder of a minority interest in a competing firm has diminished incentives to compete aggressively with the competitor firm because the holder obtains an economic benefit from the success of the competing firm through its partial ownership of that competitor.
The holder of a minority interest in a competing firm may have access to non-public, competitively sensitive information of the competing firm, and thus may be better able to coordinate its business decisions—such as pricing, output, or research and development efforts—with those of the competing firm, thus diminishing competition.

These theories of potential antitrust harm from minority interest acquisitions are not unique to the United States; other competition agencies, including the European Union’s competition directorate, accept and apply these theories when considering the competitive impact of a firm’s actual or proposed partial ownership interest in a competitor. However, the United States applies a significantly lower threshold than the European Union (and other competition agencies) for the pre-acquisition notification of an entity’s acquisition of a minority, non-controlling interest in another firm.

Read the full article here.

FTC Clarifies “Failing Firm” Defense

by McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 2, 2015 | FTC Developments, Healthcare Antitrust, Mergers & Acquisitions

Earlier this week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published an article that offers guidance on the “failing firm” or “flailing firm” defense often invoked in the hospital merger context. The article, written by Debbie Feinstein and Alexis Gilman of the Bureau of Competition, clarifies the circumstances under which this defense is and is not available.

At the outset, Feinstein and Gilman point out the basic requirements for establishing a failing firm defense, as set forth in § 11 of the Horizontal Merger guidelines:

the company is unable to meet its obligations as they come due;
the firm would not be able to reorganize successfully in bankruptcy; and
it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that would keep its assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.

The article goes on to emphasize an additional nuance required for the defense—that the acquiring company is the only available purchaser. This goes hand-in-hand with requirement three listed above. As an example, the authors describe a recent FTC investigation that involved “a hospital that was clearly failing.” The hospital’s bankrupt status did not calm the FTC’s concerns about the transaction, because the FTC learned that there was an interested alternate purchaser who did not pose the same competitive risks as the chosen acquirer.

Even if the acquisition price of a “failing” or “flailing” firm is below the Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting threshold, potential acquirers should assess the antitrust risk associated with the transaction and be sure to factor any costs associated with that risk into the sticker price. The failing or flailing firm should be prepared to demonstrate the efforts it made to find an acquirer. Non-reportable transactions are within the FTC’s reach and are often on the agency’s radar, particularly in the health care context.

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

RECENT POSTS