ANTITRUST ALERT
ANTITRUST ALERT
A Global Resource for Compliance Officers & Legal Advisors
ANTITRUST ALERT
A Global Resource for Compliance Officers & Legal Advisors
HSR Act
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New FTC Interpretation Will Require HSR Act Filing for Many Hospital Affiliation Transactions

by , and | Nov 20, 2018 | , ,

The Premerger Notification Office (PNO) of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently formalized a new position on Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act) reporting obligations for certain not-for-profit, non-stock transactions. The change is currently in effect and applies to transactions that have not yet closed. The change in position will require reporting of many hospital transactions that have not traditionally been treated as reportable events. The biggest area of change relates to affiliation transactions where hospitals or health systems affiliate under a new parent entity.

Under its previous position, the PNO focused on whether a transaction results in a change of “control” of the board of directors of one or more of the combining entities. Under its new position, the PNO will focus on beneficial ownership–whether one party receives beneficial ownership over the assets of another party as a result of the transaction. Now, a potentially reportable acquisition can occur even when there is no change in the control of the board of directors of one of the combining entities because formal board control is not the exclusive method of obtaining beneficial ownership.

In a recently published Tip Sheet, the PNO provided analysis of reportability for three types of not-for-profit combinations that it regularly sees, which we summarize below. The first two examples involve traditional application of the rules to hospital transactions, while the third example represents the PNO’s newly formed position on affiliations. Note that in all of the examples below, we focus on the nature of the transaction structure to evaluate whether a potentially reportable acquisition of assets has occurred. In any specific transaction, the parties would also need to evaluate whether the statutory thresholds are met (e.g., the $84.4 million size-of-transaction test), as well as whether any exemption applies.

1. A simple acquisition in which an existing acquiring person (g., a not-for-profit hospital) is deemed to hold the assets of the acquired entity (e.g., another not-for-profit hospital) as a result of the acquisition. This can happen in a variety of ways, such as a straight asset acquisition or a transaction in which one not-for-profit becomes the sole corporate member of another. If one not-for-profit obtains the right to manage and operate another through a corporate transaction, that is likely a reportable structure.

a. PNO conclusion: This structure is reportable as an asset acquisition.

2. A transaction in which the existing not-for-profit entities remain independent but form a new joint venture entity as a jointly owned subsidiary or affiliate. The pre-existing entities remain separate persons for HSR Act purposes.

a.  PNO conclusion: This structure is reportable. However, the 16 C.F.R. § 802.40 exemption for the formation of a not-for-profit joint venture is likely to apply.
b. The illustration below depicts this structure:

3. A transaction in which the existing not-for-profit entities consolidate under a new not-for-profit entity. The existing entities lose [...]

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THE LATEST: FTC Announces New Model Timing Agreement for Merger Investigations

by | Aug 9, 2018 | ,

WHAT HAPPENED:
  • On August 7, the FTC published a new Model Timing Agreement. Timing agreements are agreements between FTC staff and merging parties that outline the FTC’s expected timing for various events in order for it to conduct an orderly investigation during a Second Request.
  • The FTC expects the Model Timing Agreement to be used as drafted (or in a similar form) for all transactions that receive a Second Request. The FTC has used timing agreements frequently in the past, as has the DOJ, but the FTC has now published a model, which means this is likely to become the standard practice moving forward.
  • Parties are not required to enter into a timing agreement. However, in practicality, if parties do not agree to the timing agreement, the agency will proceed as if it must be in court to block the deal within 30 days of compliance. Therefore, it will prepare for litigation and will not consider settlement options or engage with the parties on the issues in the same way it would if the agency had more time under a timing agreement.
  • Some highlights of the new Model Timing Agreement are provided below (Note: All days listed refer to calendar days):
    • Parties must provide 30 days’ notice before certifying substantial compliance, and such notice cannot be provided until at least 10 days after signing the timing agreement.
    • Parties cannot close a proposed transaction until a specified time period after substantial compliance with the Second Request. The model indicates this will be 60 days in less complex matters or 90 days in more complex matters, but could be longer than 90 days in “matters involving particularly complicated industries.”
    • Parties must provide 30 days’ notice before consummating the proposed transaction and cannot provide notice more than 40 days before the date on which they have a good faith basis to believe they will have cleared other closing conditions and will be able to complete the transaction, absent an FTC action to block the transaction.
    • The agreement includes a stipulated Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which will be entered in the event of a challenge. The TRO prevents the parties from consummating the transaction until after five days following a ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction.
    • The timing agreement contains other timing-related provisions such as for document productions and investigational hearings as part of the FTC’s investigation.
WHAT THIS MEANS:
  • Though the Model Timing Agreement does not affect the statutory expiration of the HSR waiting period, it commits the parties not to consummate the transaction for a much longer period and, therefore, effectively extends the waiting period far longer than the 30 days specified under the HSR Act.
  • The 40-day notice required before the closing date means that if there is another condition in the way of closing, such as an ongoing investigation before the European Commission or in China, the parties cannot provide their notice of the anticipated closing date to the FTC. The FTC will [...]

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Trump’s DOJ Challenges Merger Cleared during Waning Days of Obama Administration

by and | Sep 27, 2017 | , ,

WHAT HAPPENED
  • On December 1, 2016 Parker-Hannifin agreed to acquire Clarcor for $4.3 billion.
  • The merger agreement included a $200 million divestiture cap – that is, Parker-Hannifin was required, if necessary, to divest assets representing up to $200 million in net sales to obtain antitrust clearance.
  • The initial antitrust waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act) expired on January 17, 2017.
  • Parker-Hannifin completed the acquisition on February 28, 2017.
  • Nearly seven months later on September 26, 2017, the DOJ filed suit in US District Court for the District of Delaware seeking to require Parker-Hannifin to divest either its or Clarcor’s aviation fuel filtration assets.
  • The DOJ did not include in its complaint an allegation or statement that the parties increased prices.
  • The DOJ press release indicates that the parties “failed to provide significant document or data productions in response to the department’s requests.” We believe that this refers to the DOJ’s post-closing investigation.
  • The DOJ did not suggest in its complaint or the press release that the parties failed to provide required documentation under the HSR Act (e.g., Item 4 documents). During the initial 30-day HSR waiting period, the parties are under no obligation to submit documentation or data to DOJ or FTC requests – all responses are voluntary.
WHAT THIS MEANS
  • Challenges to transactions after the HSR waiting period expired are rare and typically involve a situation where the parties failed to supply required documentation under the HSR Act.
  • Challenges post-HSR clearance are even rarer when the parties complied with their obligations under the HSR Act and supplied all required documentation (e.g., Item 4 documents).
  • The DOJ’s post-HSR clearance action demonstrates that the DOJ may still challenge a transaction post-closing if it later discovers a niche problematic overlap that it did not discover during the initial HSR waiting period.
  • While this challenge may be an aberration, it raises additional considerations when drafting risk allocation provisions in merger agreements for HSR reportable transactions because merger agreements do not typically account for a post-HSR clearance challenge from the DOJ or FTC.
  • DOJ action in this matter suggests the Trump administration is unlikely to be lax in its merger enforcement and will continue to analyze competition in narrow markets.


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Flurry of Antitrust Merger Enforcement Actions as Obama Presidency Comes to a Close

by | Feb 2, 2017 | , ,

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced several antitrust enforcement actions in advance of the inauguration of President Trump, including settlements for failures to file under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act), a challenge to an unreportable deal and a settlement of a “gun-jumping” claim under the HSR Act. These cases illustrate the importance of compliance with the often complex reporting, waiting period and substantive aspects of antitrust laws in connection with acquisitions of various types, whether or not those acquisitions require premerger reporting. Failure to comply can result in significant financial penalties.

Two HSR “Failure to File” Settlements. On January 17, 2017, the FTC announced two settlements for failures to submit HSR filings and observe the statutory waiting period under the HSR Act prior to consummating acquisitions that met the relevant thresholds. The HSR Act requires notification of certain acquisitions of voting securities, assets and non-corporate interests if the value held as result of the transaction is in excess of certain notification thresholds and size of person thresholds (if applicable), and the transaction is not otherwise exempt. Parties to reportable transactions must observe the statutory waiting period prior to closing. If they fail to file, or otherwise do not observe the waiting period under the HSR Act, the parties may be liable for civil penalties of up to $40,654 per day (which was recently increased from $40,000, effective February 24, 2017).

In the first settlement, Ahmet Okumus agreed to pay $180,000 in connection with failing to notify for his purchases of voting securities of Web.com Group, Inc. (Web.com). According to the complaint, in September 2014, Okumus acquired voting securities of Web.com and as a result, held approximately 13.5 percent of the voting securities of Web.com. Okumus continued to acquire voting securities of Web.com through November 2014. Okumus did not file an HSR notification prior to making these acquisitions, relying on the “investment only” exemption, which exempts acquisitions resulting in holdings of 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding voting securities if the shares are held solely for the purpose of investment (see 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) and 16 C.F.R. § 802.9). However, because Okumus held in excess of 10 percent, this exemption was not applicable. In late November of 2014, Okumus made a corrective filing that allowed him to acquire additional Web.com voting securities for approximately five years, provided that the value of the voting securities he held as a result of any acquisition did not exceed the $100 million (as adjusted) notification threshold. In a letter that accompanied his corrective filing, he indicated that the failure to file was inadvertent. The FTC did not seek civil penalties in that instance.

In June of 2016, Okumus began acquiring additional voting securities of Web.com. Later that month he acquired 236,589 voting securities of Web.com, and as a result of that acquisition, Okumus held voting securities valued (per the HSR rules) in excess of the $100 million (as [...]

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FTC Settles Allegations of HSR Act Violation by Activist Investment Fund

by | Oct 28, 2015 | ,

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a settlement on August 24, 2015, with Third Point Funds for failing to file a notification under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) in connection with the acquisition of shares in Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo) in 2011. Third Point Funds initially did not file and observe the HSR waiting period because it believed its acquisitions were exempt under the so-called “investment-only” exemption. The settlement provides insight into how the FTC interprets the investment-only exemption, and an important reminder that the HSR Act is a procedural statute for which the lack of competitive effect has no bearing on how the FTC chooses to enforce violations of its reporting requirements.

Read the full On the Subject.



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Tweet: No Antitrust Problems Here

by | Oct 7, 2013 | ,

by Lincoln Mayer

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has approved social media heavyweight Twitter’s $350 million stock acquisition of MoPub.  Twitter’s purchase of the mobile advertising exchange, which helps companies place ads on mobile devices, is expected to enhance Twitter’s ability to tailor mobile ads to users.  The size of the deal triggered the Hart-Scott Rodino (HSR) Act’s mandatory filing requirement, but the FTC concluded that the acquisition posed no anticompetitive obstacles.

This high-profile transaction is a reminder of the value of good planning and involving antitrust counsel early in the planning process, even where the parties do not anticipate significant antitrust issues.  With enough advance warning, counsel can work with the antitrust agencies to showcase the procompetitive aspects of the transaction, mitigate any problematic aspects and seek rapid clearance of deals that, at least from a competitive standpoint, are relatively straightforward.  In Twitter’s case, that meant being able to resolve a potential regulatory issue involving its largest acquisition to date before the launch of Twitter’s initial public offering.



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FTC and DOJ Accepting HSR Filings During Shutdown

by | Oct 1, 2013 | , ,

by Gregory Heltzer

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) both announced that they will have limited staff on hand to accept Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification filings during the U.S. federal government shutdown.  The HSR Act requires that parties subject to the Act must wait 30 days before closing their transaction.  This waiting period provides the agencies with time to determine whether to challenge a transaction prior to closing.  During the shutdown, the FTC will continue HSR investigations to the extent that “a failure by the government to challenge the transaction before it is consummated will result in a substantial impairment of the government’s ability to secure effective relief at a later time.”  (See, FTC Shutdown Plan.)  Likewise, the DOJ will also prepare cases that must be filed due to expiration of the HSR waiting period.  (See, DOJ Shutdown Plan.)  We will provide updates if and when we learn more regarding the protocols for merger review during the shutdown.



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Proposed Changes to HSR Rules for Pharmaceutical Companies

by | Aug 14, 2012 | , ,

by Jon B. Dubrow and Carla A. R. Hine

Today the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced proposed changes to the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification rules that will impact the types of transactions for which pharmaceutical companies will be required to file HSR notifications with the Department of Justice and FTC.  The proposed rulemaking is meant to clarify when a transfer of exclusive rights to a patent in the pharmaceutical industry results in a potentially reportable acquisition of assets under the HSR Act.

Previously — although never actually codified — the FTC would determine whether the transfer of rights to a patent (usually in the form of a license) was a reportable event under the HSR Act by focusing on whether the licensor transferred the exclusive rights to "make, use and sell" under a patent.  The emphasis on the transfer of the exclusive right to manufacture would result in scenarios where parties would not be required to report the transfer of patent rights because although the licensor transferred the rights to commercialize the product, it retained the right to manufacture the product. 

In an effort to place substance over form, the proposed rulemaking instead suggests an "all commercially significant rights" test, where a transfer of "the exclusive rights to a patent that allow only the recipient of the exclusive patent rights to use the patent in a particular therapeutic area (or specific indication within a therapeutic area)" would constitute a potentially reportable acquisition of assets if the size-of-transaction and size-of-person (if applicable) thresholds are met, and no exemption is applicable.  The proposed rules further explain that all commercially significant rights are transferred even if the patent holder retains limited manufacturing rights to provide the licensee with product(s) covered by the patent, or co-rights to assist the licensee in developing and commercializing the product(s) covered by the patent.  Please note that this rule would only apply to patents within the pharmaceutical industry (as this is the industry in which these scenarios most often occur).

The text of the proposed rulemaking can be found here.  The FTC is accepting comments until October 25, 2012.
 

UPDATE:  The U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s new proposed Hart-Scott-Rodino Act rules will apply only to transfers of pharmaceutical patent rights and are expected to increase the number of filings.  Click here to read the full article, "FTC’s Proposed Rules Would Generate More HSR Filings for Transfers of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights."



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Increased Antitrust Scrutiny of Non-Reportable or Closed Transactions

by | Jul 14, 2011 | ,

by Jon B. Dubrow and Carla A. R. Hine

In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—the two US agencies responsible for reviewing and challenging transactions that may lessen competition—have increasingly challenged non-reportable and consummated transactions.  There have been several such challenges so far in 2011, and at least nine in 2010 (all but one of which resulted in a settlement).

To read the full article, click here.



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The Top Five (Avoidable) Antitrust Traps in M&A Transactions

by | Feb 28, 2011 | , ,

by Jon B. Dubrow, Joseph F. Winterscheid and Carla A. R. Hine

In M&A transactions, early involvement of antitrust counsel is essential to avoid unnecessary expense, delay and antitrust risks.  Failure to involve antitrust counsel early on in the process may not only jeopardize the parties’ ability to obtain antitrust clearance, but it can also give rise to potential exposure for independent antitrust violations and deal risk.  This article discusses five avoidable antitrust pitfalls to keep in mind early in any transaction planning process.

To read the full article, click here. 



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