On March 3, 2020, the American Bar Association (ABA) hosted a Q&A with two members of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF)—Mark Grundvig, the Assistant Chief of the DOJ Antitrust Division’s Criminal II section, and Marcus Mills, Special Agent, Major Fraud Investigations Division, USPS Office of Inspector General.
During the course of the Q&A, Mr. Grundvig and Mr. Mills provided their perspective on the goals and progress of the PCSF.
On Monday, September 11, Tri-Union Seafoods LLC, the US subsidiary of Thai Union Group, announced it blew the whistle on competitors in the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) investigation of the packaged seafood industry. The “Chicken of the Sea” canned tuna manufacturer also said it received conditional leniency from DOJ in exchange for its cooperation.
WHAT HAPPENED:
In 2015, DOJ began investigating the packaged seafood industry for anticompetitive conduct, including price fixing. DOJ’s investigation followed a failed merger between Thai Union and Bumble Bee Foods LLC.
In May 2017, Bumble Bee pleaded guilty to violations of Sherman Act Section One. Bumble Bee agreed to fix the price of shelf-stable tuna fish from as early as the first quarter of 2011 through at least the fourth quarter of 2013. The company agreed to pay a $25 million fine, which was substantially reduced to protect the company from insolvency. Two Bumble Bee executives also pleaded guilty.
In June 2017, a former StarKist Co. sales executive pleaded guilty to price fixing.
Private plaintiffs filed class action complaints in October 2016 alleging antitrust violations in the packaged seafood industry. The private plaintiffs represent grocery retailers who sold packaged tuna to US consumers.
WHAT THIS MEANS:
Despite the significant costs of participating in DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Program, leniency recipients continue to receive significant value for their cooperation. Conditional leniency recipients like Tri-Union and their employees will not face criminal fines, jail time or prosecution.
Full cooperation with DOJ’s program will place heavy demands on leniency applicants, including gathering and translating foreign documents, bringing foreign witnesses to the United States for interviews and testimony, and providing several attorney proffers.
It is critical to have a robust compliance program in place to detect any potential or actual violations of antitrust law. Such a program will allow a company to investigate any potential misconduct and, if necessary, report it to DOJ. Time is of the essence when seeking leniency with DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Program.
Companies contemplating acquisitions should consider whether any problematic antitrust conduct could arise during the merger review and result in a subsequent criminal investigation.
On 8 October 2013, the European Commission issued updated guidance for companies making oral statements in leniency applications. The Commission requests that the oral statement is clear, factual and to the point and is only accepted during working hours.
In response to a request from the English High Court, which is currently reviewing a cartel damage claim, the European Commission has submitted an amicus curiae brief on the disclosure of leniency documents. The Commission’s opinion is that national courts should not order the disclosure of leniency documents prepared specifically for the purpose of an application under the EU leniency programme. In contrast, the applicant’s reply to the statement of objections and the replies to requests for information could be ordered to be disclosed, insofar as they do not concern leniency material.
A French court has added another layer of complexity to cartel cases in the European Union. The Commercial Court in Paris has ordered the French competition authority to disclose documents relating to an antitrust investigation. The order concerns non-confidential versions of written and oral statements gathered during the investigation.
The ruling may strengthen plaintiffs’ position in damages actions. The French court’s ruling only concerns settlements before the French competition authority but other European countries may follow France’s lead. According to the European Court of Justice’s recent Pfleiderer judgement, national courts must decide whether plaintiffs may have access to documents submitted to national Member State authorities.
The number of private damages actions in the European Union is constantly increasing. Most of these actions are "follow-on action," based on an infringement decision by the European Commission or the antitrust authority of an EU member State. Plaintiffs can rely on the infringement decision as proof for the antitrust infringement but must further substantiate and prove the harm suffered as a result of the cartel. They are therefore seeking access to information contained in the antitrust authorities’ files, in particular to leniency applications, the confidential version of the infringement decision and also settlement documents. It is still unclear whether plaintiffs will have access to leniency documents submitted to national antitrust authorities.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling of 14 June 2011 followed a case that originated in Germany. Pfleiderer, a firm in the wood industry, was considering a damages claim against members of a paper cartel. It sought access to the cartel files held by the German Competition Authority (FCO) in order to substantiate its claim. A dispute followed over whether disclosing the documents of companies who had cooperated with the FCO would undermine the national leniency programme since potential leniency applicants would fear eventual disclosure.
A German court asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling whether or not the provisions of EU competition law are to be interpreted as meaning that cartel victims can be granted access to leniency applications received by an EU Member State competition authority.
The ECJ has held that it was for the courts and tribunals of each EU Member State on the basis of their own national law to determine the conditions under which such access must be permitted or refused by weighing the interests protected by EU law. The upshot of this ruling is therefore that each judge in each Member State has a discretion as to what type of leniency document can be disclosed to a cartel victim. The ECJ has therefore distanced itself from recommendations made by the Advocate General who suggested that documents which existed before the cartel was uncovered could be disclosed but said that submissions drafted for the purpose of revealing the infringement should be protected.
For leniency applicants, weighing the decision whether to apply for leniency has now become even more complex. On the one hand, a potential leniency applicant stands to benefit from immunity, or a reduction, from fines. On the other hand, it will now have to take into consideration not only the remaining risk of a fine and criminal sanctions but also the the fact that private damages claimant might get easier access to incriminating evidence. Such complexity is all the more greater given that the ECJ’s ruling may lead to different results in different European countries.